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Money Norms
Julia Y. Lee*
Money norms present a fundamental contradiction. Norms embody
the social sphere, a system of internalized values, unwritten rules, and
shared expectations that informally govern human behavior. Money, on
the other hand, evokes the economic sphere of markets, prices, and
incentives. Existing legal scholarship keeps the two spheres distinct.
Money is assumed to operate as a medium of exchange or as a tool for
altering the payoffs of different actions. When used to make good
behavior less costly and undesirable behavior more costly, money
functions to incentivize, sanction, and deter. Although a rich literature
on the expressive function of law exists, legal scholars have generally
confined money to the economic sphere of sanctions and subsidies.
This Article attempts to bridge that gap. Money elicits a strong,
visceral, and emotional reaction, triggering (and creating expectations
of) selfishness, individualism, and self-reliance that is unaccounted for
in current legal scholarship. Money norms not only insulate our moral
values from market encroachment, but they also prescribe modes of
behavior that encourage cooperation and counteract the impulse to act
selfishly. The Article sets out a framework for understanding the
interrelationship of money norms and the law in an effort to enhance
the effectiveness of existing incentive structures. It suggests that legal
efforts to influence money norms may be more successful in the context
of morally ambiguous norms where noncompliance is both easier to
rationalize and less likely to be socially condemned.

* Associate Professor, Penn State Law. Yale Law School, J.D. 2003; Yale College, B.A., 2000.
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INTRODUCTION
Money pervades nearly every aspect of the law. It appears in statutes,
codes, regulations, legal judgments, contracts, and wills.1 In commercial
law, it operates as a medium of exchange; in tax law, it takes the form
of penalties and subsidies; in civil and criminal law, it surfaces as
damages and fines. But legal scholars have rarely focused on money as
a subject of independent study. In legal theory, money takes on value as
a tool to incentivize, sanction, and deter. It lowers the payoff of an
undesirable act, such that cooperation becomes the optimum strategy.
As a qualitative matter, it is assumed to be inert and one-dimensional, a
utilitarian means to an end.
Social science research has long suggested that the model of the
rational, utility-maximizing homo economicus fails to capture how
individuals respond to monetary incentives. Money has complex,
sometimes perverse effects. Individuals do not always make decisions
based on the existence or size of a subsidy or fine. Rather, decisions are
often shaped by attitudes, beliefs, customs, and norms. 2 Although larger
amounts of money can motivate individuals to work harder, the
progression is non-linear. More money does not necessarily translate
into more effort.3 Nor does increasing the cost of an activity invariably
decrease the rate at which it occurs.4
Money changes the cost of behaviors, but not always in predictable
ways. Individuals react differently to nonmonetary incentives of equal
market value when they are presented in explicitly monetary terms. For
instance, gifts, if explicitly priced, have been shown to have less
incentive value than those that are not.5 Studies of altruism and giftgiving have established that people engage in costly behaviors for little
or no payment.6 Moreover, many psychological studies have

1. ARTHUR NUSSBAUM, MONEY IN THE LAW 1 (1939).
2. ADRIAN FURNHAM & MICHAEL ARGYLE, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF MONEY 34 (1998).
3. James Heyman & Dan Ariely, Effort for Payment: A Tale of Two Markets, 15 PSYCH. SCI.
787, 788 (2004) (discussing the relationship between payment and effort in monetary and social
markets).
4. See Yuval Feldman & Doron Teichman, Are All ‘Legal Dollars’ Created Equal?, 102 NW.
U. L. REV. 223, 224 (2008) (exploring how the timing of payment, identity of the recipient, and
the probabilistic or certain nature of payment affect the way people respond to different legal
schemes).
5. Heyman & Ariely, supra note 3, at 792.
6. See, e.g., Roland Benabou & Jean Tirole, Incentives and Prosocial Behavior, 96 AM. ECON.
REV. 1652, 1652 (2006) (developing a theory of prosocial behavior based on intrinsic, extrinsic,
and reputational motivation); Herbert Gintis et al., Explaining Altruistic Behavior in Humans,
EVOLUTION & HUM. BEHAV. 153, 153–54 (2003) (analyzing several traits, such as strong
reciprocity, which motivates individuals to cooperate with others even at a personal cost).
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documented how money can lead to decreased motivation.7 In one of
the most famous examples, Richard Titmuss argued that paying blood
donors could actually decrease blood supply. 8 In another study, Uri
Gneezy and Aldo Rustichini found that imposing a monetary fine on
parents who were tardy in picking up their children from daycare
resulted in more late arrivals.9 Indeed, when a contract specifies fines or
damages, individuals have been shown to be more strategic and more
willing to breach their contract.10 In some contexts, the mere mention of
money triggers selfish, non-cooperative behavior.11
If this research is correct, it suggests that at least some incentive
arrangements in existing legal structures may be suboptimal. If money
generates expectations of selfishness and crowds out prosocial behavior,
its function cannot simply be understood as changing the payoffs of
different actions or serving as a medium of exchange. Instead, an
understanding of the expressive and emotive qualities of money could
more accurately predict and guide behavior. To that end, this Article
studies the normative dimension of money—specifically, social and
moral norms of money and how those norms interact with the law.
Although a rich literature on the expressive function of law exists,12
7. EDWARD L. DECI & RICHARD M. RYAN, INTRINSIC MOTIVATION AND SELFDETERMINATION IN HUMAN BEHAVIOR 1 (1985); EDWARD L. DECI, INTRINSIC MOTIVATION 1
(1975); BRUNO FREY, NOT JUST FOR MONEY, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF PERSONAL
MOTIVATION 1 (1997); Bruno S. Frey & Reto Jegen, Motivation Crowding Theory, 15 J. ECON.
SURV. 589, 589 (2001); Bruno S. Frey & Lorenz Goette, Does Pay Motivate Volunteers?
(Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, University of Zurich, Working Paper No. 007,
1999).
8. RICHARD TITMUSS, THE GIFT RELATIONSHIP: FROM HUMAN BLOOD TO SOCIAL POLICY 1
(1971).
9. Uri Gneezy & Aldo Rustichini, A Fine is a Price, 29 J. LEG. STUD. 1, 1 (2000) [hereinafter
“Gneezy & Rustichini, A Fine is a Price”].
10. See Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, Do Liquidated Damages Encourage Breach? A Psychological
Experiment, 108 MICH. L. REV. 633, 636 (2010) (offering experimental evidence that parties are
more willing to breach contracts with liquidated damages clauses).
11. Kathleen D. Vohs et al., The Psychological Consequences of Money, 314 SCI. 1154, 1154
(2006) (exploring the effects of money on human behavior using mental priming techniques).
12. See, e.g., Robert Cooter, Expressive Law and Economics, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 585, 585–
608 (1998) (developing an economic theory of expressive law) [hereinafter “Cooter, Expressive
Law and Economics”]; Alex Geisinger, A Belief Change Theory of Expressive Law, 88 IOWA L.
REV. 35, 35–74 (2002) (setting forth a theory of belief change, in which the law impacts norms by
changing individuals’ beliefs about the outcomes of certain activities); Lawrence Lessig, Social
Meaning and Social Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2181, 2181–90 (1996) [hereinafter, “Lessig,
Social Meaning”] (arguing that there are descriptive and prescriptive benefits of understanding
the social meaning of actions); Jason Mazzone, When Courts Speak: Social Capital and Law’s
Expressive Function, 49 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1039, 1039–66 (1999) (illustrating how the law goes
beyond just instructing certain parties how to act); Richard H. McAdams, An Attitudinal Theory
of Expressive Law, 79 OR. L. REV. 339, 339–90 (2000) (arguing that the law changes behavior by
expressing underlying communal attitudes); Cass Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law,
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money has often been relegated to the “economic” sphere of prices,
credit, interest rates, and incentives.13 Existing legal literature touches
on money indirectly in the form of whether—and in what
circumstances—monetary incentives function as prices or sanctions.14 A
separate literature explores the intersection of economic exchange,
intimacy, and commodification.15 But few scholars have explored norms
of money or the legal implications of money’s emotive effects. Money
triggers a wide array of emotions, from fear of being “suckered” to
anger, indignation, selfishness, suspiciousness, individualism, and selfreliance.16 In game theoretic terms, money can serve as a signal to
“defect”—i.e., free-ride—rather than to cooperate. This Article
demonstrates how money norms can counteract this tendency and
coordinate expectations. By providing a framework for analyzing the
relationship between law and money, it seeks to both challenge
prevailing assumptions of money’s utility and enhance the effectiveness
of existing incentive structures.
Part I surveys existing literature challenging the conventional view of
money as an impersonal, homogeneous medium of exchange. Part II
discusses money norms by form and function, and Part III discusses
mechanisms for the maintenance and enforcement of money norms. Part
IV analyzes the interaction of law and money norms. Part V discusses
normative implications, and Part VI concludes.
I. THE MEANING OF MONEY
Traditionally, money has been understood as an abstract and
impersonal medium of exchange, unit of account, or store of value.17
144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021, 2024 (1996) [hereinafter “Sunstein, Expressive Function”] (defining the
expressive function of law as law’s function in “making statements” as opposed to directly
regulating behavior).
13. But see Feldman & Teichman, supra note 4, at 225; Sunstein, Expressive Function, supra
note 12.
14. See, e.g., Feldman & Teichman, supra note 4, at 224; Robert Cooter, Prices and
Sanctions, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1523, 1523–60 (1984) (developing a theory of the effect of prices
and sanctions on behavior) [hereinafter “Cooter, Prices and Sanctions”]. The notable exception is
Sunstein, Expressive Function, supra note 12.
15. VIVIANA A. ZELIZER, THE PURCHASE OF INTIMACY 1 (2005) [hereinafter “ZELIZER,
INTIMACY”]; Jill E. Hasday, Intimacy and Economic Exchange, 119 HARV. L. REV. 491, 491–530
(2005); Margaret J. Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1849–1937 (1987).
16. See infra Part I.B. (describing the psychological effects of money).
17. Russell W. Belk & Melanie Wallendorf, The Sacred Meanings of Money, 11 J. ECON.
PSYCHOL. 35, 46 (1990) (citing ADRIAN FURNHAM & ALAN LEWIS, THE ECONOMIC MIND: THE
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR (1986)); see PAUL KRUGMAN & ROBIN WELLS,
ECONOMICS 2 (1st ed. 2006) (describing the role of money in a system for coordinating society’s
productive activities on both an individual and societal level); Nobuhiro Kiyotaki & Randall
Wright, On Money as a Medium of Exchange, 97 J. POL. ECON. 927, 928 (1989) (analyzing
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Economists attribute the emergence of money to the difficulties and
inefficiencies of barter, in which you “not only have to have what I
want but also have to want what I have.”18 According to this view,
money emerged to facilitate the trading of goods and services. Unlike
barter, money does not require information on the location and
trustworthiness of the other party and allows goods to be valued
relative to one another.19 Historically, various commodities—rice,
barley, cattle, iron, salt, shells, dried cod, cigarettes, salt, sugar, etc.—
have functioned as money.20 This system of “commodity money”
eventually gave way to “fiat money”—money established by
government order or fiat.21 Fiat money has no intrinsic value; it is
ultimately a social construct whose value turns on beliefs, expectations,
and social relations between its users.22 The following sections discuss
existing challenges to the conventional framework, focusing first on the
social meanings of money and then on its psychological effects.
A. Social Meaning
Money represents many things—freedom, security, power, and
status, among others.23 While necessary to satisfy our most basic needs,
it also can increase opportunities, elevate and signal our social status,
influence others, and free us from a position of dependence.24 For some,
accumulating money is an end in itself, a social and personal form of
self-expression and a metric of success and self-worth.25 For others,
money represents a corrupting force that depersonalizes and debases
social interactions.26
The meaning of money has ranged from the sacred to the profane,
defined in large part by the uses to which it has been put.27
economies where individuals specialize in consumption and production and arguing that
“introducing fiat currency into a commodity money economy may unambiguously improve
welfare”); Raymond H. Lounsbury, What is Money?, 27 AM. ECON. REV. 765, 765 (1937)
(arguing money should not be understood simply as a unit of account and medium of exchange).
18. WILLIAM S. JEVONS, MONEY AND THE MECHANISM OF EXCHANGE 1 (1875); see also
ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 22–23
(1784).
19. NIGEL DODD, THE SOCIOLOGY OF MONEY xxii, 42 (1994).
20. A. Mitchell Innes, What is Money?, 30 BANKING L.J. 377, 377 (1913).
21. N. GREGORY MANKIW, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 220 (7th ed. 2014).
22. NIGEL DODD, THE SOCIAL LIFE OF MONEY 8–9 (2014).
23. HENRY C. LINDGREN, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF MONEY 6 (1991).
24. LINDGREN, supra note 23, at 6.
25. See FURNHAM & ARGYLE, supra note 2, at 102.
26. See Russell W. Belk & Melanie Wallendorf, The Sacred Meanings of Money, 11 J. ECON.
PSYCHOL. 35, 46 (1990) (arguing that modern money retains sacred meanings).
27. Belk & Wallendorf, supra note 26, at 36–37.
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Anthropologists have long studied the symbolic function of primitive
monies, which have served to signal social, moral, or ritual status.28 In
certain villages, multiple currencies coexisted at the same time, with
different currencies having specific, designated uses. 29 For instance,
certain monies could be used only for food, while others were set aside
for funeral or marriage gifts, purchasing wives, or magical rites.30 In
what is now the Republic of Zaire, raffia cloth could be used for rituals
and ceremonies, including paying damages for adultery. However, it
could not be used to buy food, clothing, or shelter.31 Different monies
were also reserved for women or specified social classes.32 In some
remote areas of the Pacific, communal norms designated lower value
coins or mussel shells for women, while reserving more valuable large
stones for men.33
Sociologist Viviana Zelizer has shown that modern money has been
subject to similar restrictions. Distinguishing between “market money”
and “special monies,” Zelizer demonstrated how individuals attribute
different meanings and uses to different types of money. 34 For instance,
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, changing cultural
and social relationships between husbands, wives, parents, and children
shaped domestic money.35 Married women’s money, otherwise known
as “pin money,” was treated as a distinct—and lesser—type of currency
than the ordinary dollar.36 Pin money could only be used for charity or
certain types of household expenses and was routinely trivialized as
“money for trinkets and trifles.”37 Individuals categorized,
differentiated, and invented multiple currencies—from housekeeping
allowances to spending money, gifts, and remittances—attributing

28. See id. at 45, 47–48; see also Viviana A. Zelizer, The Social Meaning of Money: Special
Monies, 95 AM. J. SOC. 342, 348 (1989) [hereinafter “Zelizer, Special Monies”] (examining how
some primitive cultures used certain monies for certain occasions).
29. See Zelizer, Special Monies, supra note 28, at 348 (discussing money’s cultural and social
significance through its symbolic meaning outside the market).
30. Id.; see also W.I. THOMAS & FLORIAN ZNANIECKI, THE POLISH PEASANT IN EUROPE AND
AMERICA 164–65 (1958).
31. Belk & Wallendorf, supra note 26, at 48.
32. Zelizer, Special Monies, supra note 28, at 348; see also PAUL EINZIG, PRIMITIVE MONEY
29–31 (2nd ed. 1966).
33. Zelizer, Special Monies, supra note 28, at 342.
34. VIVIANA A. ZELIZER, THE SOCIAL MEANING OF MONEY 5 (1994) [hereinafter “ZELIZER,
SOCIAL MEANING”].
35. Zelizer, Special Monies, supra note 28, at 343–44.
36. Id. at 344.
37. Id. at 369 (quoting Mary Anderson, United States Daily, 21 J. HOME ECON. 920 (1929)).
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different meanings to different forms of exchange.38 Zelizer debunked
the classic economic view of money as a qualitatively neutral,
impersonal medium of exchange. She demonstrated not only that many
types of money exist, but also that each type of money is subject to
distinct social and cultural rituals.39
While sociologists have focused on how social relations impact the
way individuals differentiate and make sense of money, behavioral
economists have studied the role of cognitive processes in that
differentiation—in particular, the way money is earmarked once it is
added to a separate account.40 Although standard economic theory
posits that dollars are fungible,41 experimental results have shown that
individuals and businesses attach different labels to different categories
of money.42 For instance, some households use separate budgets for
grocery shopping, dining out, and recreational expenses.43 Under what
has become known as “mental accounting,” individuals and households
employ a set of cognitive processes to organize and categorize financial
activities.44 Money in one account does not substitute for money in
another account.45 Individuals allocate expenditures into budgets, group
wealth into accounts, and separate income into categories.46 For
instance, many individuals use different budgets for grocery shopping,
restaurants, vacations, Christmas gifts, weddings, funerals, and college
tuition. When funds in one category are depleted, individuals tend to be
reluctant to draw from another category, even though the funds come
from the same source.47 Rather than reacting rationally and
dispassionately to money, individuals pay attention to sunk costs, buy
things they don’t need, and employ mental shortcuts.48

38. See Viviana Zelizer, Payments and Social Ties, 11 SOC. F. 481, 484 (1996) [hereinafter
“Zelizer, Payments”] (discussing the manner in which households differentiated and segregated
monies based upon needs).
39. See generally ZELIZER, SOCIAL MEANING, supra note 34 (discussing the assignment of
different meanings and uses to money).
40. See Nina Bandelj et al., Advancing Money Talks, in MONEY TALKS: EXPLAINING HOW
MONEY REALLY WORKS 5–6 (Nina Bandelj et al. eds., 2017) [hereinafter “MONEY TALKS”];
Jonathan Morduch, Economics and the Social Meaning of Money, in MONEY TALKS at 25.
41. See MILTON FRIEDMAN, A THEORY OF THE CONSUMPTION FUNCTION 3 (1957).
42. See Richard H. Thaler, Mental Accounting and Consumer Choice, 4 MARKETING SCI. 199,
200 (1985) [hereinafter “Thaler, Consumer Choice”].
43. Id. at 200.
44. Richard H. Thaler, Mental Accounting Matters, 12 J. BEHAV. DEC. MAKING 183, 183–84
(1999) [hereinafter “Thaler, Mental Accounting”].
45. Id. at 185.
46. Id. at 193.
47. Thaler, Consumer Choice, supra note 42, at 200.
48. Thaler, Mental Accounting, supra note 44, at 203.
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B. Psychological Effects
Money elicits a host of other irrational behaviors and emotions, from
greed to selfishness, jealousy, fear, disgust, and resentment.49
Researchers in economic psychology have set forth several theories to
explain the subversive effects of monetary incentives. These include the
view that money (1) crowds out intrinsic motivation, (2) dilutes the
visibility of prosocial behavior (for those who act in order to appear
prosocial), and (3) creates the expectation that the counterparty is
selfish.50 In a series of experiments, Kathleen Vohs, Nicole Mead, and
Miranda Goode demonstrated how the mere mention of money
prompted individuals to behave selfishly and anti-socially.51
Participants who completed sentence-scrambling tasks related to money
proved to be more self-sufficient, less willing to ask for help, and less
willing to help others. They sought to spend more time alone and chose
seats farther away from others.52 The authors surmised that money,
which allows people to reach goals without relying on the help of
others, generates the expectation that individuals should fend for
themselves.53 They concluded that money elicits individualism and
crowds out communal values and motivations.54
Examples abound of how extrinsic incentives, particularly in the form
of money, can crowd out intrinsic motivation.55 In his book, The Gift
Relationship, Richard Titmuss famously argued that paying for blood
donations could not only reduce the quality and quantity of blood
collected, but also the intrinsic motivation of altruistic donors and others
driven by a sense of civic duty.56 In one study, support for the
49. FURNHAM & ARGYLE, supra note 2, at 38.
50. See Lorenz Goette & Alois Stutzer, Blood Donations and Incentives: Evidence from a
Field Experiment 7–8 (Fed. Res. Bank of Bos., Working Paper No. 08-3, 2008).
51. Vohs et al., supra note 11, at 1154.
52. Id. at 1155–56.
53. Id. at 1154, 1156.
54. Id. at 1156.
55. This is known as the motivation crowding effect. See Bruno S. Frey & Felix OberholzerGee, The Cost of Price Incentives: An Empirical Analysis of Motivation Crowding-Out, 87 AM.
ECON. REV. 746, 746 (1997) (presenting a theory that the introduction of price incentives can
crowd out intrinsic motivation); see generally EDWARD L. DECI & RICHARD M. RYAN, INTRINSIC
MOTIVATION AND SELF-DETERMINATION IN HUMAN BEHAVIOR (1985) (exploring the innate
psychological motivating factors that drive human action).
56. TITMUSS, supra note 8, at 245–46 (theorizing that the commercialization of blood
donations could lead to inefficiency in the system, as well as a spike in pricing and decline in
quality); see generally KIERAN HEALEY, LAST BEST GIFTS: ALTRUISM AND THE MARKET FOR
HUMAN BLOOD AND ORGANS (2006) (comparing and contrasting the blood and organ donation
systems of the United States and Europe, with particular focus on the altruistic aspect of
donating); Nicola Lacetera & Mario Macis, Do All Material Incentives for Prosocial Activities
Backfire? The Response to Cash and Non-Cash Incentives for Blood Donations (Inst. for the
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construction of socially desirable, but noxious facilities such as
incinerators, airports, or prisons decreased when monetary
compensation to local residents was offered.57 In another study, high
school students collecting charitable donations worked harder when
they were not compensated than when they were offered a small sum.58
Similarly, when the AARP asked lawyers to provide legal services to
retirees for $30 per hour, they were turned down, but when the lawyers
were asked to provide free services, they accepted. 59 One explanation
was that when money was offered, the values of altruism and civic duty
were crowded out and replaced by market pricing. The $30 per hour
was found to be an inadequate—and perhaps insulting—valuation of the
lawyers’ time.60
On the penalty side, when a daycare started charging parents a small
fine for late pick-ups, the number of late arrivals increased.61 Even after
the fine was later removed, parents continued to arrive late. The
experimenters hypothesized that introducing the monetary fine reshaped
parents’ perception of the consequences of arriving late.62 In place of an
internalized sense of guilt or shame for having inconvenienced the
teachers, the fine signaled that arriving late was a commodity that could
be purchased at will. The fine, in other words, was the price of arriving
late.63
These and other studies indicate that when payment is in the form of
cash, individuals are more likely to interpret the reward as direct
compensation, rather than as a token of gratitude.64 In addition, for
those motivated by the desire to appear unselfish and prosocial, external
monetary incentives can frustrate the signaling value of prosocial
activity.65 By contrast, non-monetary rewards such as coupons, lottery
Stud. of Lab. (IZA) Discussion Paper No. 4458 (2009) (suggesting that although donors do not
have a general aversion to material incentives, they are averse to cash payments for their
prosocial actions).
57. Frey & Oberholzer-Gee, supra note 55, at 753 (showing that the crowding-out effect
explained the decrease in support for the construction of a noxious facility when compensation
was offered).
58. Uri Gneezy & Aldo Rustichini, Pay Enough or Don’t Pay at All, 115 Q. J. ECON. 791
(2000) [hereinafter “Gneezy & Rustichini, Pay Enough”]. If monetary incentives are high
enough, however, larger payments result in greater effort.
59. DAN ARIELY, PREDICTABLY IRRATIONAL: THE HIDDEN FORCES THAT SHAPE OUR
DECISIONS 71 (2009).
60. Id.
61. Gneezy & Rustichini, A Fine is a Price, supra note 9, at 1.
62. Id. at 3.
63. Id. at 14.
64. Lacetera & Macis, supra note 56, at 3.
65. See Dan Ariely et al., Doing Good or Doing Well? Image Motivation and Monetary
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tickets, or a paid vacation day do not appear to have the same crowdingout effects.66
These results are consistent with other studies showing that money
has powerful framing effects. Dan Ariely and James Heyman conducted
a series of experiments to test the incentive effects of different forms of
money.67 They found that money caused participants to invoke market
frames and norms.68 When money was not involved—or when payment
was in the form of a gift—participants invoked social norms and
worked harder than in situations where they were offered only a small
monetary payment.69 In mixed markets, where payment was in the form
of a gift but the cost of the gift was mentioned, the participants
interpreted the relationship to be a market exchange and thus were
highly sensitive to the magnitude of the payment.70 The authors
concluded that money had a negative impact on motivation because it
situated individuals in a market frame rather than a social frame.71
Similar framing effects have been observed when the trigger is not
explicitly monetary, but only evocative of money. In a famous
experiment, psychologist Lee Ross and his co-authors had two different
groups play the prisoner’s dilemma game with identical monetary
payoffs.72 One group was told they were playing “the Community
Game” while the other was told they were playing “the Wall Street
Game.”73 The results were striking. Participants playing the Community
Game cooperated between 67–75 percent of the time, while those
playing the Wall Street Game cooperated only about 33 percent of the
time.74 The situational label had a far greater impact on whether the
players cooperated or defected than the predictions of non-participants
Incentives in Behaving Prosocially, 99 AM. ECON. REV. 544, 545 (2009) (testing the potentially
detrimental effects of extrinsic incentives on prosocial behavior); see also Benabou & Tirole,
supra note 6, at 1653 (illustrating that individuals are motivated to act based on the desire to
demonstrate their generosity and selflessness, as well as to conform their behavior to their selfimage); Kristen Underhill, When Extrinsic Incentives Displace Intrinsic Motivation: Designing
Legal Carrots and Sticks to Confront the Challenge of Motivational Crowding-Out, 33 YALE J.
REG. 213, 243 (2016) (discussing how incentives may interfere with reputational motivation—
i.e., the signals that individuals send to observers of their behavior).
66. See Goette & Stutzer, supra note 50, at 4.
67. Heyman & Ariely, supra note 3, at 787.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 792.
71. Id.
72. Varda Liberman et al., The Name of the Game: Predictive Power of Reputations Versus
Situational Labels in Determining Prisoner’s Dilemma Game Moves, 30 PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. BULL. 1175, 1175 (2004).
73. Lieberman et al., supra note 72, at 1176 (describing the authors’ study design).
74. Id. at 1177.
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who knew them well.75 In the Wall Street Game, participants expected
the other players to defect, whereas in the Community Game, they
expected the other players to cooperate.76 The authors reasoned that the
Wall Street label produced expectations of individualism, self-interest,
competitiveness, and exploitation, while the Community label produced
expectations of interdependence and collective interest.77
Other experiments have confirmed these results. Individuals in oneshot prisoner’s dilemma games cooperate more when the game is
framed as an international negotiation rather than a business
transaction,78 or as a “social exchange study” rather than a “business
transaction study.”79 Experimental evidence suggests that situational
frames operate not so much by changing internalized norms, but by
changing the expectations that individuals have of others’ behavior.80 In
the absence of other contextual cues, money, business, or financial
labels generally create an expectation that the counterparty will behave
selfishly and defect, prompting individuals to behave in kind.81
This psychological research suggests that the law’s treatment of
money as an economic tool for incentivizing (or disincentivizing)
behavior may be excessively narrow. Money is a complex and richly
imbued symbol that triggers strong, sometimes irrational, emotions.
When money becomes an end in itself, it can be viewed as a subversive
force.82 The mere mention of money can send a signal that the other
party seeks to maximize his or her own payoffs at the expense of others.
How, then, does cooperation arise in one-shot strategic interactions
where the primary situational frame is monetary? Law is one answer,
but as discussed in the next Part, money norms play a more significant

75. Id. at 1175.
76. Id. at 1182.
77. Id. at 1176.
78. J.R. Eiser & K. Bhavnani, The Effect of Situational Meaning on the Behavior of Subjects
in the Prisoner’s Dilemma Game, 4 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 93, 97 (1974).
79. C. Daniel Batson & Tecia Moran, Empathy-Induced Altruism in a Prisoner’s Dilemma, 29
EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 909, 922 (1999).
80. Tore Ellingsen et al., Social Framing Effects: Preferences or Beliefs?, 76 GAMES & ECON.
BEHAV. 117, 118 (2012).
81. That is not to say that money always creates this expectation. In some contexts, such as in
the employer-employee context, money in the form of higher wages can be a positive signal,
motivating employees to work harder. See George A. Akerlof, Labor Contracts as Partial Gift
Exchange, 47 Q.J. ECON. 543, 543–44 (1982); Dan M. Kahan, Trust, Collective Action, and Law,
81 B.U. L. REV. 333, 334 (2001) [hereinafter “Kahan, Trust, Collective Action”] (arguing that
when individuals perceive that others are acting cooperatively, they will be moved by honor and
similar motivations to contribute to public goods even without incentives).
82. Belk & Wallendorf, supra note 26, at 46 (pointing out that money can evoke strong
negative emotions, such as revulsion and disgust).
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role in channeling expectations and fostering cooperation.
II. FORM AND FUNCTION
The term “norm” has numerous meanings that vary across
disciplines. In its broadest sense, it encompasses rules and regularities,
patterns of action, formal organizational rules, shared values, shared
meanings, and informal social controls.83 A more narrow approach
limits the term to social norms, as distinct from conventions, legal
norms, or moral norms.84 As used in this Article, “money norms” are
behavioral rules and expectations regarding money. They are customary
monetary rules of behavior—how we are supposed to act when it comes
to money. This Article does not limit the term to social norms—norms
sustained by the approval or disapproval of others.85 Instead, it uses the
term in a broad, inclusive sense to encompass monetary conventions.
Conventions are generalized modes of behavior in which individuals
desire to coordinate with others and have no incentive to deviate
unilaterally.86 Examples include driving on the right side of the road,
using a particular sign language, or putting the fork on the left side of
the plate.87 Legal norms are rules of behavior that are enacted and
enforced by government actors.88 Moral norms are the rules of morality
that prescribe and proscribe behavior.89 Examples include the
prohibitions against murder, rape, and incest.90
Social norms refer to “informal social regularities that individuals
feel obligated to follow because of an internalized sense of duty,
because of a fear of external non-legal sanctions, or both.”91 They are
83. Christine Horne, Sociological Perspectives on the Emergence of Social Norms, in SOCIAL
NORMS 3–4 (Michael Hechter & Karl-Dieter Opp eds., 2001).
84. JON ELSTER, THE CEMENT OF SOCIETY: A STUDY OF SOCIAL ORDER 100–01 (1989)
[hereinafter “ELSTER, CEMENT OF SOCIETY”].
85. Id.
86. See Cristina Bicchieri, Norms, Conventions, and the Power of Expectations, in
PHILOSOPHY OF SOCIAL SCIENCE: A NEW INTRODUCTION 208, 216 (2014) [hereinafter
“Bicchieri, Norms”]; CRISTINA BICCHIERI, THE GRAMMAR OF SOCIETY: THE NATURE AND
DYNAMICS OF SOCIAL NORMS, at x (2006) [hereinafter “BICCHIERI, GRAMMAR OF SOCIETY”];
ELSTER, CEMENT OF SOCIETY, supra note 84, at 12; JON ELSTER, EXPLAINING SOCIAL
BEHAVIOR: MORE NUTS AND BOLTS FOR THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 315 (2007) [hereinafter
“ELSTER, EXPLAINING SOCIAL BEHAVIOR”]; George J. Bowdery, Conventions and Norms, 8
PHIL. OF SCI. 493, 494 (1941).
87. See ELSTER, CEMENT OF SOCIETY, supra note 84, at 101–02.
88. ELSTER, EXPLAINING SOCIAL BEHAVIOR, supra note 86, at 357.
89. William Harms & Brian Skyrms, Evolution of Moral Norms, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK
OF PHILOSOPHY OF BIOLOGY 1 (Michael Ruse ed., 2008).
90. Id.
91. Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH. L.
REV. 338, 340 (1997) [hereinafter “McAdams, Origin of Norms”].
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“injunction[s] to act or to abstain from acting”92 or rules and practices
that specify “what is acceptable and what is not in a social group.”93
Social norms are shared by other people94 and enforced by third parties
other than the state.95 They can be internalized and transformed by
social relations96 and are maintained by informal sanctions, such as
gossip, censure, or social ostracism.97 Examples include the norms of
not cutting ahead of others in line, picking up after one’s dog, or
returning favors.98 Individuals conform to social norms based on
internalized preferences and expectations about other people’s behavior
and beliefs.99 Unlike moral norms, which are usually unconditional,
social norms are conditionally followed and may function differently in
groups of different sizes.100
Considerable overlap exists among the different categories. 101 Many
moral norms—for instance, the prohibition on murder—are enacted into
laws. Similarly, the contents of many social and moral norms are
virtually indistinguishable, and conventions can become social norms
when they are enforced through social sanctions.102 Rather than
working within the framework of these existing typologies, this Article
classifies money norms through the schema of restrictions—
specifically, form, source, manner, and use restrictions.
While norms on the form of money are convention equilibria that

92. ELSTER, EXPLAINING SOCIAL BEHAVIOR. supra note 86, at 354.
93. BICCHIERI, GRAMMAR OF SOCIETY, supra note 86, at ix.
94. Jon Elster, Rationality and Social Norms, 32 EUR. J. SOC. 109, 111 (1991) [hereinafter
“Elster, Rationality”].
95. See Robert C. Ellickson, The Evolution of Social Norms: A Perspective from the Legal
Academy, in SOCIAL NORMS 35 (Michael Hechter & Karl-Dieter Opp eds., 2001); Lior J.
Strahilevitz, ‘How’s My Driving’ for Everyone (and Everything?), 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1699,
1759–60 (2006).
96. Viviana A. Zelizer, How I Became a Relational Economic Sociologist and What Does
That Mean?, 40 POL. & SOC’Y. 145, 161 (Fred Block ed., 2012) [hereinafter “Zelizer, Relational
Economic Sociologist”].
97. ELSTER, EXPLAINING SOCIAL BEHAVIOR, supra note 86, at 354–55.
98. Sunstein, Expressive Function, supra note 12, at 2031.
99. BICCHIERI, GRAMMAR OF SOCIETY, supra note 86, at 8–9.
100. Id.; see also Lior J. Strahilevitz, Social Norms from Close-Knit Groups to Loose-Knit
Groups, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 359, 360–365 (2003) (analyzing whether and how social norms arise
in loose-knit groups).
101. These typologies have been contested and others exist. See Benoît Dubreuil & JeanFrançois Grégoire, Are Moral Norms Distinct from Social Norms? A Critical Assessment of Jon
Elster and Cristina Bicchieri, 75 THEORY & DECISION 137, 149 (2013) (arguing that rigid
typologies between various types of norms should be abandoned); see also Geoffrey P. Miller,
Norms and Interests, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 637, 640–41 (2003) (noting difficulty of drawing a
sharp distinction between laws, norms, and related social practices).
102. BICCHIERI, GRAMMAR OF SOCIETY, supra note 86, at 41–42.
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solve coordination dilemmas,103 norms on the source, manner, and use
of money operate to constrain self-interest in strategic interactions
modeled as prisoner’s dilemmas. Unlike the coordination dilemma, an
individual in the prisoner’s dilemma is better off defecting no matter
what the other party does. Hence, acting simultaneously, both players
defect even though they would have been better off if they had
cooperated.104 Individually rational behavior results in an outcome in
which everyone is worse off.105 Money norms provide a solution to the
dilemma directly by changing the underlying payoffs, and expressively
by changing expectations. By making defection costlier through formal
or informal sanctions, money norms incentivize individuals to
cooperate.
A. Form Restrictions
Norms on the form of money operate not by changing payoffs, but by
coordinating expectations. Although they are more accurately
characterized as conventions, this Article will classify them as a type of
money norm. Conventions are behavioral regularities that arise in
situations involving multiple equilibria where individuals wish to
coordinate with others. In pure coordination dilemmas, players have
common interests: they prefer to do what others are doing, so long as
enough others are doing them.106 Once everyone is cooperating, there is
no incentive to defect. Because there are different ways of behaving in a
mutually advantageous way,107 the challenge is to find a way to match
strategies with the other players.
Conventions are one solution to the dilemma.108 They operate in
much the same manner as focal points to align expectations and achieve
coordination.109 By focusing attention on a particular behavior, they
103. Convention equilibria are situations where each player is playing his best response to
what other players are doing. No one can improve his outcome by unilaterally deviating, and no
one wants anyone else to deviate from conforming to the convention. See ELSTER, CEMENT OF
SOCIETY, supra note 84, at 12; Richard H. McAdams, Beyond the Prisoner’s Dilemma:
Coordination, Game Theory, and Law, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 209, 212 (2009) [hereinafter
“McAdams, Beyond Prisoner’s Dilemma”]; Nicholas Southwood & Lina Eriksson, Norms and
Conventions, 14 PHIL. EXPLORATIONS 195, 195 (2011).
104. Peter Kollock, Social Dilemmas: The Anatomy of Cooperation, 24 ANN. REV. SOC. 183,
186 (1998).
105. Id. at 183, 186.
106. ELSTER, CEMENT OF SOCIETY, supra note 86, at x; THOMAS C. SCHELLING, THE
STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 54–58 (1960); McAdams, Beyond Prisoner’s Dilemma, supra note 103,
at 250.
107. Southwood & Ericksson, supra note 103, at 197.
108. Id.
109. Richard H. McAdams, A Focal Point Theory of Expressive Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1649,
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produce self-fulfilling expectations that that behavior will occur.110
Because coordination on any equilibrium is superior to defecting,
individuals act in conformity with what they expect others will do.111
Monetary conventions are self-sustaining and often arbitrary.112 They
also do not depend on the law for their efficacy. Individuals follow the
convention because they expect that others will do the same. The
individual gains nothing by unilaterally defecting. This Part discusses
two kinds of monetary conventions: (1) currencies and (2) payment
mechanisms.
1. Currencies
a. The Dollar
With any type of currency, people wish to coordinate with others to
use whatever form of currency others are using. Defection is pointless:
if others are using a particular currency, the individual derives no
benefit from switching to a different currency. People use the U.S.
dollar not because the government orders them to do so, but because
they expect that everyone else will use it.113 Law, however, functions to
facilitate the initial adoption of the convention, primarily through fiat or
other proclamation. This makes the particular behavior salient and
creates the expectation that other people will follow that behavior.114
Law, in other words, creates a focal point around which individuals can
coordinate their behavior.115
The use of the dollar is perhaps one of the most successful examples
of a convention created through government proclamation. Before the
Civil War, banks printed their own paper money and thousands of

1658–59 (2000) [hereinafter “McAdams, Focal Point”]. Focal points are things in an environment
that draw the mutual attention of the parties and make salient one form of behavior over another.
For instance, in an experiment where participants from New Haven were asked to name a time
and place to meet another person in New York City, a majority chose Grand Central Station, a
focal point around which they coordinated. See id.; McAdams, Beyond Prisoner’s Dilemma,
supra note 103, at 231–32; SCHELLING, supra note 106, at 57–58 (1960).
110. McAdams, Beyond Prisoner’s Dilemma, supra note 103, at 231.
111. Id.
112. ELSTER, EXPLAINING SOCIAL BEHAVIOR, supra note 86, at 357.
113. RICHARD H. MCADAMS, THE EXPRESSIVE POWERS OF LAW: THEORIES AND LIMITS 57
(2015) [hereinafter “MCADAMS, EXPRESSIVE POWERS”].
114. See, e.g., Richard H. McAdams & Janice Nadler, Coordinating in the Shadow of the
Law: Two Contextualized Tests for the Focal Point Theory of Legal Compliance, 42 LAW &
SOC’Y REV. 865, 866 (2008) (discussing how laws can directly influence how people coordinate).
115. McAdams, Focal Point, supra note 109, at 1650 (“[I]ndividuals often act in ways that
benefit themselves but prevent a large group from achieving its best outcome.”).
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different currencies were in circulation in the United States.116 In 1861,
in an attempt to finance the Civil War, Congress authorized the issuance
of $50 million in demand notes, so-named because they were
redeemable in gold coin “on demand.”117 This was followed in 1862 by
the issuance of $150 million in U.S. notes, popularly known as
greenbacks.118 Greenbacks were the first fiat currency—convertible into
Treasury bonds, but not backed by gold or silver.119 It was not until the
National Banking Act of 1863, however, that Congress created a
national banking system and established a uniform national currency. 120
Even then, coordination around the dollar was not immediate. Congress
facilitated the use of the dollar by placing a tax on bank notes issued by
state banks.121 And on May 22, 1933, Congress enacted a law declaring
all coin and currencies in circulation to be legal tender.122 This
proclamation was carried through to the Coinage Act of 1965, which
declares U.S. coins and currency legal tender for all debts, taxes, and
dues.123
International coordination around the dollar resulted in large part
from a carefully orchestrated campaign by then-Assistant Secretary of
the Treasury Harry Dexter White at the Bretton Woods Conference.124
In July 1944, delegates from forty-four nations met to establish an
international monetary system that would contribute to exchange rate
stability, prevent competitive devaluations, and promote greater
116. GLYN DAVIES, A HISTORY OF MONEY: FROM ANCIENT TIMES TO THE PRESENT DAY
482–83 (2002).
117. JOSEPH F. JOHNSON, MONEY AND CURRENCY IN RELATION TO INDUSTRY, PRICES AND
THE RATE OF INTEREST 263 (1905); HEATHER C. RICHARDSON, THE GREATEST NATION OF THE
EARTH: REPUBLICAN ECONOMIC POLICIES DURING THE CIVIL WAR 69 (1997).
118. DAVIES, supra note 116, at 490–491.
119. Id.
120. Richard Sylla, Federal Policy, Banking Market Structure, and Capital Mobilization in
the United States, 1863–1913, 29 J. ECON. HIST. 657, 659 (1969).
121. Id. at 662–63.
122. H.R.J. Res. 192, 73d Cong. (1933) (enacted).
123. Coinage Act of 1965 § 1(19), 31 U.S.C. § 5103 (2011). Section 5103 provides that cash
is a valid and legal method of paying all debts, but does not require businesses, persons, or
organizations to accept cash as payment for goods or services. See also U.S. Dep’t of Treasury,
Legal Tender Status (Jan. 4, 2011, 4:47 PM), https://www.treasury.gov/resourcecenter/faqs/Currency/Pages/legal-tender.aspx:
[N]o Federal statute mandating that a private business, person or an organization must
accept currency or coins as for payment for goods and/or services. Private businesses
are free to develop their own policies on whether or not to accept cash unless there is a
State law which says otherwise.
124. See generally BENN STEIL, THE BATTLE OF BRETTON WOODS: JOHN MAYNARD
KEYNES, HARRY DEXTER WHITE, AND THE MAKING OF A NEW WORLD ORDER (2013) for a
compelling narrative account of Secretary White’s role in the U.S. strategy at the Bretton Woods
Conference.
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international trade.125 White outmaneuvered his rival, John Maynard
Keynes, who advocated for a new international currency called
“bancor” to replace gold.126 Instead, White secured agreement for the
U.S. dollar to replace all references to “gold convertible currency” in
the draft documents.127 As a result, every country that was party to the
agreement eventually pegged their country’s currency to the dollar.128
Under the Bretton Woods system, international balances were settled in
dollars, and dollars were convertible into gold at a fixed rate of $35 per
ounce.129 The United States opportunely owned nearly 75 percent of the
world’s gold at the time, and the dollar took its place as the currency of
international trade.130 Although President Franklin D. Roosevelt
terminated the dollar’s convertibility into gold for U.S. citizens under
H.J. Res. 192 on July 5, 1933, it remained convertible for foreign
governments until President Richard Nixon’s decree on August 15,
1971.131 Congress officially terminated the gold value of the dollar on
March 16, 1973, when the dollar formally became fiat currency. 132
b. Alternative Currencies
Although the law helps establish coordination around a particular
monetary form, it is not essential. Numerous currencies have emerged
independent of the state. For instance, in Switzerland during the Great
Depression, a network of Swiss businesses introduced a new currency
called the Swiss WIR based on a system of mutual credit.133 In
Sardinia, Italy, a group of friends founded a local electronic currency
called Sardex, another system of mutual credit and exchange through
which member firms offered goods or services to others in the
network.134 And in the Berkshires in New York, more than 400

125. Sandra K. Ghizoni, Establishment of the Bretton Woods System, FED. RES. HIST. (Nov.
22, 2013), http://www.federalreservehistory.org/Events/DetailView/28.
126. STEIL, supra note 124, at 143.
127. Id. at 215–16.
128. Id. at 251–52.
129. Id. at 28.
130. R.A. Mundell, A Reconsideration of the Twentieth Century, 90 AM. ECON. REV. 327, 333
(2000); Benn Steil, Would a New ‘Bretton Woods’ Save the Global Economy?, PBS NEWSHOUR,
(May 15, 2013), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/making-sense/would-a-new-bretton-woods-save.
131. Id. at 334.
132. CRAIG K. ELWELL, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, R41887, BRIEF HISTORY OF
THE GOLD STANDARD IN THE UNITED STATES 1, 11-13 (June 23, 2011); Frequently Asked
Questions:
Gold
&
Silver,
FEDERAL
RESERVE
BANK
RICHMOND,
https://www.richmondfed.org/faqs/gold_silver (last visited Sept. 20, 2017).
133. Edward Posnett, The Sardex Factor, FIN. TIMES MAG. (Sept. 18, 2015),
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/cf875d9a-5be6-11e5-a28b-50226830d644.html#.
134. Id. (describing the Sardinian-founded local electronic currency Sardex).
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businesses accept a local currency called BerkShares.135 Other local
currencies include “Equal Dollars” in Philadelphia, “Ithaca Hours” in
Ithaca, New York, and “Barter Bucks” in Kansas City, Missouri.136
Currencies also have flourished outside of the business world. In the
1970s in Washington, D.C., the Capitol Hill babysitting co-op,
composed of staffers in Congress looking after one another’s children,
issued its own currency, called “scrip,” on heavy pieces of paper.137
Babysitters in the co-op received scrip as payment, with one scrip
paying for one-half hour of babysitting time.138 In prisons, where
inmates are barred from using cash, money has taken the form of
cigarettes, mackerel (or “mack”), tuna, coffee, and postage stamps,
among other items.139 When the Bureau of Prisons prohibited smoking
in 2004, “mack” replaced cigarettes as the currency of choice.140 On the
streets, liquid Tide detergent has become another form of currency: one
150-ounce bottle goes for either $5 cash or $10 worth of marijuana or
crack cocaine.141
c. Bitcoin and Other Virtual Currencies
Perhaps the best-known alternative currency is Bitcoin, a
decentralized digital currency that is created, held, and transferred
electronically. No central authority or government controls the
currency, and no third-party financial institutions take part in the
transactions.142 Buyers and sellers transact directly with each other,
though their identities are hidden and no personal information is
shared.143 “Miners,” or administrators, maintain the peer-to-peer
135. Paul Kemp-Robertson, 10 Alternative Currencies, from Bitcoin to BerkShares to Sweat
to Laundry Detergent, TED BLOG (July 25, 2013), http://blog.ted.com/10-alternative-currenciesfrom-bitcoin-to-berkshares-to-sweat-to-laundry-detergent/.
136. Id.; Viviana A. Zelizer, Circuits Within Capitalism, in THE ECONOMIC SOCIOLOGY OF
CAPITALISM 289, 299–305 (Victor Nee & Richard Swedberg, eds., 2005) [hereinafter “THE
ECONOMIC SOCIOLOGY OF CAPITALISM”] (providing examples of local currencies in the United
States).
137. Joan Sweeney & Richard J. Sweeney, Monetary Theory and the Great Capitol Hill Baby
Sitting Co-op Crisis, 9 J. MONEY, CREDIT, & BANKING 86, 86 (1977).
138. Id.
139. Justin Scheck, Mackerel Economics in Prison Leads to Appreciation for Oily Fillets,
WALL STREET J., Oct. 2, 2008, at A1.
140. Id.
141. Ben
Paynter,
Suds
for
Drugs,
N.Y.
MAG.,
Jan.
6,
2013,
http://nymag.com/news/features/tide-detergent-drugs-2013-1/.
142. Stephen T. Middlebrook, Bitcoin for Merchants: Legal Considerations for Businesses
Wishing to Accept Bitcoin as a Form of Payment, BUS. L. TODAY 1, 1 (Nov. 2014); Bill Maurer,
Blockchains Are a Diamond’s Best Friend: Zelizer for the Bitcoin Moment, in MONEY TALKS,
supra note 40, at 219–20.
143. EDWARD V. MURPHY ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43339, BITCOIN: QUESTIONS,
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network and authenticate transactions.144 Transfers of ownership are
recorded on a publicly accessible blockchain—a ledger or master
database of bitcoins—and are not reversible.145 Miners maintain the
blockchain through a network of communicating nodes running Bitcoin
software and receive bitcoins in return for their service.146 The
blockchain provides a “permanent, verifiable,” and “public ledger
maintained among nontrusted parties or peers.”147
In large part due to its perceived anonymity, Bitcoin has emerged as
the currency of choice for online criminals.148 Although Bitcoin arose
outside the bounds of the state (a factor that has contributed to its
appeal), widespread adoption has been hampered by its broad use in
illegal markets, as well as doubts as to its legality, security, and longterm prospects. The law can facilitate or impede coordination on the use
of Bitcoin in several ways. Most obviously, if Congress were to follow
the lead of China, Bangladesh, Bolivia, and Ecuador and ban or restrict
its use, Bitcoin’s growth would be severely curtailed.149 Alternatively,
the government can signal the legitimacy of the currency through
regulation or public pronouncement. When U.S. law enforcement and
regulatory officials acknowledged the benefits of Bitcoin and other
virtual currencies during Congressional hearings in 2013, its price
soared and many new businesses began accepting it.150 Similarly, the
Japanese government’s legalization of Bitcoin as a payment mechanism

ANSWERS, AND ANALYSIS OF LEGAL ISSUES 1 (2015).
144. Middlebrook, supra note 142, at 1.
145. Id. at 1–2.
146. Id. at 1.
147. Maurer, supra note 142, at 227 (explaining the purposes of the blockchain).
148. See Stephen Mihm, Are Bitcoins the Criminal’s Best Friend?, BLOOMBERG VIEW (Nov.
18, 2013, 12:29 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2013-11-18/are-bitcoins-thecriminal-s-best-friend (last visited July 11, 2017) (discussing the use of Bitcoin in criminal
activity).
149. See, e.g., Marcin Szczepanski, Bitcoin: Market, Economics, and Regulation, EUR. PARL.
RES. SERV., at 9 (Nov. 4, 2014) (depicting a chart showing a significant projected decline);
Anthony Cuthbertson, Ecuador Reveals National Digital Currency Plans Following Bitcoin Ban,
INT’L BUS. TIMES (Sept. 1, 2014, 9:48 BST), http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/ecuador-reveals-nationaldigital-currency-plans-following-bitcoin-ban-1463397 [hereinafter “Cuthbertson, Ecuador
Following Bitcoin Ban”] (describing Ecuador’s ban on Bitcoin and its potential effects on the
nation’s economy); Anthony Cuthbertson, Cryptocurrency Round-up: Bolivian Bitcoin Ban,
INT’L BUS. TIMES (June 20, 2014, 9:32 BST), http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/cryptocurrency-roundbolivian-bitcoin-ban-ios-apps-dogecoin-mcdonalds-1453453
[hereinafter
“Cuthbertson,
Cryptocurrency Round-up”] (relaying the Bolivian Central Bank’s statement on the ban: “[i]t is
illegal to use any kind of currency that is not issued and controlled by a government or an
authorised entity”).
150. Ryan Tracy, Authorities See Worth of Bitcoin, WALL STREET J. (Nov. 18, 2013),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304439804579205740125297358.
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prompted major retailers to accept Bitcoin.151 The legal
pronouncements heightened expectations that other people would use
Bitcoin, further propagating its use.
2. Payment Mechanisms
Norms also exist as to the appropriate payment mechanism to be
used. For instance, certain transactions are expected to be conducted in
cash: payment at garage sales or to street vendors, occasional
babysitting, allowances to children,152 tips to bellhops, and the giving of
alms,153 among others. Homes are purchased by check, while
businesses are purchased by wire transfer. Groceries, furniture, and
other consumer goods are increasingly purchased by credit or debit
card.154 Although the law does not prohibit payment of taxes in cash,155
a norm exists to pay by check or ACH transfer. Attempts to pay taxes in
cash have been derided as childish, bitter, or petty.156 Similarly, a norm
exists against paying for goods, services, and fines in pennies or other
loose change.157
Payment norms vary by business, nationality, or socio-economic
group. For instance, many nail salons, barber shops, and small
restaurants demand payment in cash. Online businesses, sharingeconomy platforms, and in-flight services, however, require payment by

151. Arjun Kharpal, Bitcoin Value Rises Over $1 Billion as Japan, Russia Move to Legitimize
Cryptocurrency CNBC (Apr. 12, 2017), http://www.cnbc.com/2017/04/12/bitcoin-price-risesjapan-russia-regulation.html.
152. See Belk & Wallendorf, supra note 26, at 48.
153. James Hudnut-Beumier, Why Cash Remains Sacred in American Churches, WASH. POST
(July 6, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/acts-of-faith/wp/2017/07/06/why-cashremains-sacred-in-american-churches/?utm_term=.ad6e306a0c71.
154. See generally RONALD J. MANN, PAYMENT SYSTEMS AND OTHER FINANCIAL
TRANSACTIONS: CASES, MATERIALS, AND PROBLEMS (6th ed. 2016) (discussing changing
payment trends).
155. See 31 U.S.C. § 5103 (2011) (“United States coins and currency (including Federal
reserve notes and circulating notes of Federal reserve banks and national banks) are legal tender
for all debts, public charges, taxes, and dues.”).
156. See, e.g., Kelly Phillips Erb, Texas Man Arrested After Attempt to Pay Taxes with Dollar
Bills,
FORBES
(Feb.
3,
2015,
9:40
PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/kellyphillipserb/2015/02/03/texas-man-arrested-after-attempt-topay-taxes-with-dollar-bills/#1e4368a58327.
157. See, e.g., Alex Santoso, Don’t Mess with New Jersey: Paying with Pennies Got Man into
Trouble, NEATORAMA (Dec. 17, 2008, 3:19 AM), http://www.neatorama.com/2008/12/17/dontmess-with-new-jersey-paying-with-pennies-got-man-into-trouble/ (describing a New Jersey
municipal court that put out a warrant for a man’s arrest after he paid for a $56 traffic ticket in
pennies); Ed Krayewski, Penn. Town Cites Federal Reg About Pennies as Payment That Expired
50 Years Ago, HIT & RUN BLOG (Aug. 14, 2015), http://reason.com/blog/2015/08/14/penn-towncites-federal-reg-about-pennie (detailing a similar story where a man was barred from paying a
parking ticket in pennies).
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credit or debit card. Teenagers and college-age students rely heavily on
Venmo, which incorporates social media so that users can track others’
payment activities.158 In immigrant or low-income communities, where
many individuals do not have bank accounts or credit cards, cash is the
convention. Similarly, criminals have long conducted business
exclusively in cash, though Bitcoin has become the currency of choice
for online criminal transactions.159 In certain parts of the world,
including Germany, India, China, Japan, Brazil, and Spain, cash
continues to be the predominant payment mechanism.160 Forms of
payment also denote different social ties and relations between
employer and employee. Government workers are compensated by
salary,161 whereas individuals in the service industry are often paid by
the hour.162
B. Source Restrictions
Certain types of money norms are restrictions on the source of
money. For instance, “blood money” and “dirty money” are monies
tainted by their source. Blood money can refer to money earned from
death, murder, or mass human suffering,163 money paid to the family of
a person who has been killed,164 or money earned from individual
defendants, rather than liability insurance companies. 165 “Dirty money”
refers to money derived from illegal activities, such as theft, forgery, or
bribery. In contrast to the “honest dollar,” blood money and dirty money
are considered tainted by their ethically problematic roots.166
Individuals perceive “immoral” or dirty money to have less purchasing
power and feel compelled to cleanse it in various ways. 167
158. Maurer, supra note 142, at 216 (explaining the features of Venmo and its most common
uses).
159. Id. at 220.
160. Here are the Top Cashless Countries in the World, BUS. TODAY (Dec. 29, 2016, 16:55
IST), http://www.businesstoday.in/current/economy-politics/here-are-the-top-cashless-countriesin-the-world/story/241430.html.
161. See NICHOLAS R. PARRILLO, AGAINST THE PROFIT MOTIVE: THE SALARY REVOLUTION
IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT, 1789–1940 (2013).
162. See Zelizer, Payments, supra note 38, at 487.
163. Blood Money, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2017) (“[M]oney obtained at
the cost of another’s life.”).
164. Id.
165. Tom Baker, Blood Money, New Money, and the Moral Economy of Tort Law in Action,
35 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 275, 275 (2001).
166. ZELIZER, SOCIAL MEANING, supra note 34, at 3 (explaining how blood money is viewed
as stained due to its origins).
167. See Nina Bandelj et al., Morals and Emotions of Money, in MONEY TALKS, supra note
40, at 41–42 (distinguishing religious and secular meanings of money); Jennifer E. Stellar &
Robb Willer, The Corruption of Value: Negative Moral Associations Diminish the Value of
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Source restrictions have moral, social, or legal origins. Individuals
and organizations seek to maintain moral identities and view immorally
obtained money as threats to that identity. 168 The Vatican, for instance,
has denounced “dirty money” donations earned from exploitation and
abuse, particularly of low-income workers.169 Churches routinely return
donations and tithings paid by members who obtained the money
through fraud or other illicit means.170 Prostitutes and criminals also
segregate clean money from dirty money by, for instance, reserving
money obtained from honest sources for paying bills or making church
donations.171 Money obtained by theft or prostitution, however, is set
aside for drugs, alcohol, and recreational expenses.172
In tort litigation, a norm exists against collecting blood money—that
is, real money from real people—rather than money from insurance
companies.173 The norm is sustained by social, rather than legal,
sanctions. By contrast, the law specifically targets the practice of
generating income through illegal means. Money laundering involves
the process of transforming dirty money into “clean money”—i.e.,
money originating from a legitimate source.174 Anti-money laundering
(“AML”) regulations penalize anyone who knowingly attempts to
conceal or disguise financial transactions involving the “proceeds of
some form of unlawful activity.”175
The law differentiates between dirty and clean money in numerous
areas. Consider source restrictions on mortgages. The Federal Housing
Administration (“FHA”), for instance, requires banks to document the
source and nature of mortgage down payments when the borrower pays
Money, 5 SOC. PSYCHOL. & PERSONALITY SCI. 60 (2014) (suggesting that tainted money can
have immoral associations that threaten to harm the recipient’s moral self-image).
168. Stellar & Willer, supra note 167, at 64 (reiterating that immorally obtained money
threatens an individual’s ability to maintain a moral identity).
169. Lydia Tomkiw, Catholic Church Corruption: Pope Francis Says No to ‘Dirty Money’
Donations, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Mar. 2, 2016, 9:02 AM), http://www.ibtimes.com/catholic-churchcorruption-pope-francis-says-no-dirty-money-donations-2328719.
170. See, e.g., Tad Walch, LDS Church Will Return Tithing Donated by Man Who Defrauded
5,400
Victims,
DESERET
NEWS
UTAH
(May
31,
2017,
11:25
PM),
http://www.deseretnews.com/article/865681124/LDS-Church-will-return-tithing-donated-byman-who-defrauded-5400-victims.html (providing an example of a church returning money
donated by a man who pleaded guilty to fraud).
171. ZELIZER, SOCIAL MEANING, supra note 34, at 3.
172. Id.
173. Baker, supra note 165, at 314 (explaining the norm among tort litigators to collect money
from insurance companies rather than “blood money” from individuals).
174. History of Anti-Money Laundering Laws, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, FIN. CRIMES
ENF’T NETWORK, https://www.fincen.gov/history-anti-money-laundering-laws (last visited Aug.
20, 2017).
175. See 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (2015) (defining the crime of money laundering).
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more than 2 percent of the sales price or when any payment “appears
excessive based upon the borrower’s history of accumulating
savings.”176 Acceptable sources of a down payment include cash from
savings and checking accounts, savings bonds, IRAs and 401(k)
accounts, investments, gift funds, and proceeds from the sale of
personal property.177
C. Time, Manner, Place Restrictions
Time, manner, place restrictions are the rules of etiquette that govern
socially appropriate behavior with regard to money. They function to
segregate the social from the market sphere and are primarily enforced
through social sanctions. Examples include norms against asking a
neighbor to mow one’s lawn or a colleague to clean one’s office;178
attempting to purchase someone else’s place in line; 179 failing to tip; or
asking about a person’s salary or the cost of a gift, furnishing, or piece
of clothing.180 Money itself is a taboo conversation topic,181 although
this varies considerably among cultures.182
It is inappropriate to offer money in certain social contexts, such as
payment for meals, favors, slights, or hurt feelings. 183 Gifts may be
exchanged during courtship, but not money.184 It is also inappropriate to
put a price on things that people expect to be free or that are not
considered part of the business world. Examples include the air we
breathe, the enjoyment of nature,185 and conversations with others.
176. FHA Loan Rules: Sources of Your Down Payment, FHA.COM (June 4, 2017),
http://www.fha.com/fha_article?id= 316 [hereinafter “FHA Loan Rules”].
177. Id. (discussing acceptable sources of a down payment).
178. See ELSTER, CEMENT OF SOCIETY, supra note 84, at 110; Sunstein, Expressive Function,
supra note 12, at 2037.
179. ELSTER, EXPLAINING SOCIAL BEHAVIOR, supra note 86, at 365.
180. ELIZABETH L. POST, EMILY POST’S ETIQUETTE: A GUIDE TO MODERN MANNERS 225,
391–403 (14th ed. 1984).
181. See, e.g., David W. Krueger, Money, Success, and Success Phobia, in THE LAST TABOO:
MONEY AS SYMBOL AND REALITY IN PSYCHOTHERAPY AND PSYCHOANALYSIS 3, 3–16 (David
W. Krueger ed., 1986) (exploring social norms surrounding the discussion of money).
182. See, e.g., Xin Lu, Chinese Money Habits—How My Culture Influences My Attitudes
Toward Money, WISE BREAD (Mar. 5, 2008), http://www.wisebread.com/chinese-money-habitshow-my-culture-influences-my-attitudes-toward-money (explaining that it is more socially
acceptable to discuss money and salaries in China); Lisa Roolant, We Asked People from
Different Countries What They Earned. You’ll Never Guess What Happened, TRANSFERWISE
(Dec. 7, 2016), https://transferwise.com/us/blog/we-asked-people-from-different-countries-whatthey-earned-youll-never-guess-what-happened (offering an example of the differences between
Indian and European cultures with respect to discussing salary).
183. Sunstein, Expressive Function, supra note 12, at 2037.
184. See ZELIZER, INTIMACY, supra note 15, at 115–18 (discussing the social norms around
courtship).
185. However, the government may charge entrance fees to public parks.
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Attempts to put a price on things that are free or that people would
never think of as not being “free” are perceived as rude and offensive.
Putting a price on something results in a categorical shift that changes
the nature of the relationship.186 Among friends, neighbors, and
colleagues, offering cash compensation for another’s time or labor
signals impersonality and social distance, as well as an improper
valuation of the other person.187 Monetary transactions may also
dissipate the willingness to spontaneously help others in the
community.188 Similarly, when certain individuals or organizations start
charging for things that used to be free or that we expect to be free,
irreparable damage can result. The hostility of many veterans to the
American Red Cross provides a case in point.189 In 1942, upon request
of the Secretary of War, the Red Cross began charging GIs for coffee
and doughnuts during World War II after having previously offered
them for free.190 The intense anger, hostility, and sense of betrayal over
this action are being felt by the Red Cross to this day.191
D. Use Restrictions
Use restrictions are another broad category of money norms. Use
may be restricted due to (1) the identity of the actor, (2) the qualities of
the target, or (3) the intended purpose. Consider uses of money that are
restricted because of the identity of the actor or target. Public goods
such as parking spaces or airwaves may be sold by the government, but
not by private parties. Certain individuals may use money to buy guns,
but others—including adolescents, criminals, the mentally disabled, and
undocumented immigrants—may not.192 Payments or gifts that are
otherwise socially acceptable become unacceptable if the recipient is a
public official, such as a politician or judge. The Emoluments Clause,
for instance, bars any person holding public office from accepting gifts
or payments of any kind from foreign governments.193
Money norms also dictate that there are certain things money should
not be able to buy—for instance, children, organs, spouses, votes, public
186. See supra Part I.B. (exploring the psychological effects of money).
187. ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES 78
(1991).
188. ELSTER, CEMENT OF SOCIETY, supra note 84, at 142.
189. Chana Joffe-Walt, The Cost of Free Doughnuts: 70 Years of Regret, NPR PLANET
MONEY (July 13, 2012, 2:49 PM), http://www.npr.org/sections/money/2012/07/13/156737801/
the-cost-of-free-doughnuts-70-years-of-regret.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Gun Control Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2015).
193. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8.
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office, body parts, sexual favors, or exemption from military service.194
These restrictions are in large part a product of the perceived corrupting
and devaluing effects of money.195 Under this view, putting a price on a
good or a behavior diminishes and commodifies it, sending a signal that
society does not properly value it or values it in the wrong way. 196
Finally, the use of money may be restricted because of the intended
purpose. The crime of bribery, for instance, is defined as either
“corruptly giv[ing], offer[ing] or promis[ing] anything of value to any
public official . . . with intent [] to influence any official act” or “being a
public official” and “corruptly demand[ing], seek[ing], receiv[ing], [or]
accept[ing] . . . anything of value personally . . . in return for [] being
influenced in the performance of any official act.”197 Extortion, ransom,
and blackmail violate norms and laws against using violence or threats
to obtain money from another. Hush money, for instance, violates
norms against paying money to induce silence.198 Similarly, murderfor-hire violates norms against taking the life of another.199 Some use
restrictions are not backed by law, but are sustained by moral
reprehension. Consider the controversy that surrounds cash-forsterilization programs.200 Regardless of any greater good, the use of
money to induce drug-addicted women to relinquish their reproductive
capacity has been vilified as coercive and corrupt.201
By contrast, money norms extol certain uses of money, such as
paying for basic living expenses or saving for retirement, college
tuition, and home mortgage down payments. The norm of saving is
stronger in some cultures than in others. The average Chinese
household, for instance, saves nearly 30 percent of its disposable

194. MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND EQUALITY
100–03 (Basic Books eds., 1983).
195. MICHAEL J. SANDEL, WHAT MONEY CAN’T BUY: THE MORAL LIMITS OF MARKETS 111
(Farrar, Straus, and Giroux eds., 2012).
196. Id. at 110–13 (explaining two objections to markets: the fairness argument and the
corruption argument). There are other things, such as love or friendship, which money cannot
buy. See id. at 93; see also Sunstein, Expressive Function, supra note 12, at 2038 (discussing the
commodification of sexuality and reproductive capacity).
197. Bribery of Public Officials and Witnesses, 18 U.S.C. § 201 (2015).
198. See George P. Fletcher, Blackmail: The Paradigmatic Crime, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1617,
1620 (1993) (defining hush money and other examples of blackmail).
199. See Satoshi Kanazawa & Mary C. Still, The Emergence of Marriage Norms: An
Evolutionary Psychological Perspective, in SOCIAL NORMS 274, 281 (Michael Hechter & KarlDieter Opp eds., 2001) (discussing norms against murder, rape, and incest).
200. SANDEL, supra note 195, at 43–44 (detailing the origins of cash-for-sterilization
programs and the subsequent pushback).
201. Id. at 46.

2017]

Money Norms

83

income.202 Save too much, however, and you are a miser; save too little,
and you are a spendthrift. The money norms of thrift and generosity go
hand-in-hand to regulate spenders and savers at either extreme. A norm
also exists against using money to flaunt one’s wealth, particularly
where doing so highlights inequalities.203
III. ENFORCEMENT
Money norms are unique in that money and norms are assumed to
inhabit separate spheres. In the absence of other cues, money signals the
existence of a market exchange and generates perceptions of selfishness
and individualism.204 Norms, on the other hand, are the creature of
social forces. Because of their capacity to elicit powerful, often
irrational emotions, behavioral rules related to money are inherently
complex. This Part examines several non-legal mechanisms for
sustaining and enforcing money norms: (a) mutual interests, (b) social
sanctions, (c) internalized values, (d) religion, and (e) coercion.205
A. Mutual Interests
Some money norms are self-sustaining. Because they serve both
parties’ interests, no separate enforcement mechanism is necessary.
Norms on the form of money do not require external enforcement
because it is in the interests of everyone to conform to what others are
doing. These norms are sustained by shared expectations about the
appropriate solution to a given coordination dilemma.206 If everyone
uses and accepts the dollar, there is no incentive to use a separate
payment form.
B. Social Sanctions
Individuals adhere to certain norms, such as the rules of etiquette,
because they seek esteem—the good opinion or respect of others—and
fear social sanctions.207 In both laboratory and real-world settings,
202. Dexter Roberts, The Chinese Can’t Kick Their Savings Habit, BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK (Apr. 30, 2015, 7:16 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-0501/chinese-consumers-cling-to-saving-suppressing-spending.
203. ELSTER, CEMENT OF SOCIETY, supra note 84, at 142-43 (discussing the norm against
showcasing one’s wealth, particularly in small communities).
204. See supra Part I.B. (exploring the psychological effects of money).
205. See, e.g., Diego Gambetta, Mafia: The Price of Distrust, in TRUST: MAKING AND
BREAKING COOPERATIVE RELATIONS 158, 168 (Diego Gambetta ed., 1988) (detailing the mafia’s
use of coercion and mutual economic interests to generate compliance).
206. H. Peyton Young, Social Norms, in NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS
(Steven N. Durlauf & Lawrence E. Blume, eds., 2d ed. 2008).
207. See McAdams, Origin of Norms, supra note 91, at 355 (explaining the “esteem” theory
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individuals have shown a willingness to incur substantial costs to obtain
the respect and admiration of others.208 Social sanctions for noncompliance include gossip, ridicule, disapproval, condemnation, and
ostracism. An offer to pay a coworker to clean one’s office or a
neighbor to mow one’s lawn would be met with scorn and offended
feelings. By complying with these norms, individuals seek to signal that
they are a cooperative “good type”209 with an upright character and
good upbringing.
Examples abound of money norms that are followed for fear of social
sanctions. Rotating savings and credit associations (“Roscas”), for
instance, have proven to be a remarkably resilient and effective form of
financing for ethnic communities despite the absence of legal sanctions.
Examples include the Korean “kye,” the African “sou-sou” or “esusu,”
the Mexican “tanda,” or the Japanese “mujin.”210 These rotating credit
groups consist of a group of people who each contribute a set amount of
money at a fixed time to a common pot. Members take turns taking
from the pot, with early takers essentially receiving an interest-free
loan.211 Given that these sums are dispersed without written contracts,
what prevents early takers from absconding with the funds? Social
connectedness and fear of ostracism are key. Roscas are usually formed
among individuals who are acquainted with one another or with the
organizer.212 Members sanction defaulters socially and prevent them
from further participation.213 Ostracism is particularly effective because
members are often individuals with little or no access to formal credit

of norms).
208. McAdams, Origin of Norms, supra note 91 at 356 (stating that people often incur
material costs to cooperate in situations where the only reward is the respect and admiration of
their peers).
209. ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS 18 (Harv. Univ. Press rev. ed., 2000)
[hereinafter “POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS”].
210. KEMPE RONALD HOPE, SR., DEVELOPMENT IN THE THIRD WORLD: FROM POLICY
FAILURE TO POLICY REFORM 117 (1996).
211. See Eric A. Posner, The Regulation of Groups: The Influence of Legal and Nonlegal
Sanctions on Collective Action, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 133, 169–70 (1996) [hereinafter “Posner,
Regulation of Groups”] (explaining how members rotate taking from the pot, with later takers
saving and earlier takers borrowing, paying little to no interest for their loans).
212. See Timothy Besley et al., The Economics of Rotating Savings and Credit Associations,
83 AM. ECON. REV. 792, 794 (1993) (“Roscas are thus typically formed among individuals whose
circumstances and characteristics are well known to each other.”).
213. See id. (explaining that individuals who default are “sanctioned socially” and prevented
from Rosca participation in the future); Donald V. Kurtz & Margaret Showman, The Tanda: A
Rotating Credit Association in Mexico, 17 ETHNOLOGY 65, 69 (1978) (explaining that when a
member defaults they may suffer socially and emotionally and will likely not be invited to
participate again).
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markets.214
C. Internalized Values
Money norms may also be sustained by internalized values such as
morality and perceived fairness. An example of an internalized norm is
tipping when traveling out of town, where the risk of social sanction is
remote.215 Individuals follow the norm because of an internalized sense
of shame or guilt, a desire to sustain their self-image of being generous
and kind, and perhaps empathy for workers who work hard, but earn
little.216 Similarly, individuals adhere to the norm of not selling
children, spouses, or organs not so much because of a fear of external
sanctions, but because of an internalized sense of morality. Even if it
were legal to sell our children, most of us would not do so because it
feels unethical, immoral, and wrong. The public outcry that followed
Richard Posner’s so-called “baby selling article” is only one
example.217
Moreover, because money serves as a cue that the other party may
behave opportunistically, money norms are unlikely to be effective
unless they are perceived to be fair. Experimental evidence
demonstrates that individual behavior is shaped not only by the desire to
maximize material payoffs, but also by fairness concerns. 218 Many
people punish others at considerable personal cost when they perceive
that others are behaving selfishly. 219 In numerous controlled
experiments isolating the impact of fairness motives, individuals have
consistently sought to reduce the payoff of those who act, or appear to
act, unfairly.220
214. See Besley, supra note 212, at 794 (explaining that members of a Rosca are typically not
able to borrow in a formal credit market because it is presumed they would be unable to repay a
loan).
215. See McAdams, Origin of Norms, supra note 91, at 384 (discussing the American norm of
tipping in comparison with norms abroad).
216. Ofer H. Azar, What Sustains Social Norms and How They Evolve? The Case of Tipping,
54 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 49, 49–50 (2004).
217. Richard A. Posner, The Regulation of the Market in Adoptions, 67 B.U. L. REV. 59, 59
(1987) [hereinafter “Posner, Adoptions”]; Elisabeth M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The
Economics of the Baby Shortage, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 323, 323–24 (1978).
218. Ernst Fehr & Klaus M. Schmidt, Theories of Fairness and Reciprocity: Evidence and
Economic Applications, in ADVANCES IN ECONOMICS AND ECONOMETRICS 1 (Mathias
Dewatripont et al. eds., 2003).
219. Id. at 2.
220. Id. at 37; see, e.g., Sally Blount, When Social Outcomes Aren’t Fair: The Effect of
Causal Attributions on Preferences, 63 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 131, 131
(1995); Armin Falk et al., Testing Theories of Fairness–Intentions Matter, 62 GAMES & ECON.
BEHAV. 287, 288 (2008); John H. Kagel et al., Fairness in Ultimatum Games with Asymmetric
Information and Asymmetric Payoffs, 13 GAMES & ECON. BEHAV. 100, 100 (1996); Theo
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Consider the demise of peer-to-peer mobile platforms such as
Haystack Mobile Technologies, Monkey Parking, and Sweetch that
allowed drivers to sell parking spots to other drivers.221 The Haystack
app allowed users to alert others when they were leaving a parking spot,
usually for a fee of $3 to $5, $0.75 of which Haystack kept. The “MakeMe-Move” feature on the app allowed drivers to auction off their
parking spots to the highest bidder.222 The public uproar that ensued is
instructive. Founder Eric Meyer was decried as a “jerk” (among other
unsavory epithets), and the term “jerk tech” was coined for self-serving,
“compassionless” startups “that exploit small businesses and public
infrastructure to make a buck and aid the wealthy.” 223 Angry politicians
in Boston, Los Angeles, San Francisco, and Santa Monica introduced
ordinances banning the app, spelling the demise of the company. 224
A similar fate befell apps like ReservationHop, which made
reservations at popular restaurants, then sold them to users for $5 to
$10. The app provided a name to give at the door, creating the
impression that the reservation had been made by the user.225 The idea
sparked an onslaught of vehement criticism, with invectives from
“irresponsible” to “sleazy” leveled at the company. 226 What was it
about Haystack and ReservationHop that people found so offensive?
What accounted for the outpouring of anger, contempt, and hatred for
these companies?
The answer lies in the violation of money norms—including norms
against selling something you do not own and charging for things that
Offerman, Hurting Hurts More than Helping Helps: The Role of Self-Serving Bias, 46 EUR.
ECON. REV. 1423, 1423 (2002).
221. Josh Costine, Stop the JerkTech, TECH CRUNCH (July 3, 2014),
https://www.wallstreetdailytechcrunch.com/2014/08/11/haystack-parking-app-jerktech07/03/godisrupt-yourself/.
222. Alan F., Why In-Street Parking App Haystack Failed, PHONE ARENA (Jan. 25, 2015,
11:47
PM),
http://www.phonearena.com/news/Why-in-street-parking-app-Haystackfailed_id65211 [hereinafter “PHONE ARENA”].
223. See Costine, supra note 221 (discussing the resulting demise of “JerkTech”); see also
Christopher Mims, No ‘Free Parking’ for an App That Tried, WALL STREET J., (Jan. 25, 2015,
8:16
PM),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/no-free-parking-for-an-app-that-tried-1422234966
(interviewing the founder of Haystack).
224. See PHONE ARENA, supra note 222 (discussing how Haystack and similar apps were
banned in various large American cities).
225. Lisa Eadicicco, People Are Freaking Out About a Startup That Snags Restaurant
Reservations and Sells Them, BUS. INSIDER (July 4, 2014, 12:15 PM),
http://www.businessinsider.com/reservationhop-app-2014-7.
226. Anthony Ha, Everyone Seems Mad at ReservationHop, Founder Admits He Was ‘Taken
Aback’
By
the
Criticism,
TECH
CRUNCH
(July
3,
2014),
https://techcrunch.com/2014/07/03/everyone-seems-mad-at-reservation-hop-founder-admits-hewas-taken-aback-by-the-criticism.
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should be free—and deep-seated notions of fairness. Boston City
Council member Frank Baker summed up the basis of the opposition to
Haystack: “My understanding was that [the parking spot sellers] were
trying to buy and sell public property that wasn’t theirs to buy and
sell.”227 An editorial on TechCrunch, a technology website, stated, “All
of these apps are essentially tools for scalping a public good or open
resource. They don’t deserve to take something that’s supposed to be
free and first-come-first-serve so they can sell it.”228 Another editorial
railed, “We’re talking about public property here, so it’s important to
make sure everyone has a chance to access the scarce resource. Putting
a free-market price on public parking spots could make them
unaffordable for poor people, and that would be unfair.”229
But the unfairness objection was not simply about the sale of public
versus private goods, as ReservationHop and similar apps were not
attempting to sell public goods. Like Haystack, ReservationHop sold
something that it did not own—reservations at restaurants—but the
objection ran deeper. After all, other sharing economy companies such
as Airbnb and Uber also profit from things they do not own, but they
did not encounter the same level of public opposition (though they
encountered considerable opposition from the industries they disrupted).
The crucial difference was that ReservationHop tried to sell something
that people expected to be free—reservations at a restaurant—as
opposed to something like lodging or cab services, which had always
commanded a price. Contrast the experience of ReservationHop with
Opentable, which provides a similar restaurant reservation service.
Opentable, however, does not charge customers for making
reservations. It instead charges restaurants fixed subscription fees each
month, akin to standard brokerage arrangements or finders’ fees.230
With parking apps such as Haystack, the offense consisted of more
than simply attempting to sell something that used to be free: the apps
were used for both paid and free spots. The perceived unfairness
stemmed from two sources. First, Haystack’s attempt to take a cut—no
matter how minuscule—of a resource that belonged to the public was
227. See PHONE ARENA, supra note 222 (explaining the city’s concern that profits were being
made off of city property which did not belong to the person selling the parking spot).
228. See Costine, supra note 221 (emphasis added) (detailing various criticisms of “JerkTech”
apps like Haystack).
229. Curt Woodward, The Endless Saga of Haystack, An Illegal App That Tried to Sell Public
Parking, BOSTON GLOBE (June 10, 2015), http://www.betaboston.com/news/2015/06/10/theendless-saga-of-haystack-an-illegal-app-that-tried-to-sell-public-parking.
230. Eleanor Miller, Opentable Explained: Here’s How the Company Makes Money, BUS.
INSIDER (Oct. 26, 2011, 11:09 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/opentable-explainer-201110 (last visited Jan. 4, 2017).
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perceived as unfair and predatory. Even when these startups offered to
share their proceeds with the cities or restaurants at issue, the hostility
remained. Intentions mattered. Presumably, if the city of Boston had
hired Haystack to assist it in easing parking congestion, giving Haystack
a small share of the proceeds, the outcome would have been different.
But the process by which Haystack undertook to profit from something
that was not theirs to sell contributed to the sense that they had acted
unfairly. The second objection was inequality of outcome. By putting a
price on parking spaces that used to be free, Haystack made it more
difficult for the poor to obtain parking. A similar objection was raised
against ReservationHop, which made it harder for ordinary people to
make restaurant reservations.231
Perhaps one of the most egregious examples of a money norm that
was perceived as inherently unfair was the now-defunct norm of paying
a commutation fee or providing a substitute to avoid military service.
During the Civil War, the Enrollment Act of 1863 allowed two means
of avoiding the draft: paying a commutation fee of $300 or providing a
substitute.232 Commutation was widely condemned as favoring the rich
and penalizing the poor. During that time, $300 was equivalent to a
workingman’s annual wage, making commutation unfeasible for all but
the rich.233 The Civil War came to be known as a “rich man’s war but a
poor man’s fight.”234 Central to the law’s unpopularity was its intrinsic
unfairness—forcing poor men to risk their lives while exempting others
for a price.235 The public’s resentment reached such a point that the
provision was quickly repealed the following year.236
D. Religion
Some money norms are sustained by fear of divine, as opposed to
social, sanctions. For instance, the norm against charging usurious
interest rates has roots in Christianity, Islam, Judaism, Hinduism, and
Buddhism, among other religions.237 Under canon law, the sin of usury
was defined as any return on a loan beyond the principal.238 Biblical
231. See Ha, supra note 226.
232. Peter Levine, Draft Evasion in the North During the Civil War, 1863-1865, 67 J. AM.
HIST. 816, 816 (1981).
233. Eugene C. Murdock, Was It a ‘Poor Man’s Fight’?, 10 CIV. WAR HIST. 241, 241 (1964).
234. Id.
235. WALZER, supra note 194, at 90.
236. Murdock, supra note 233, at 241.
237. Wayne A.M. Visser & Alastair McIntosh, A Short Review of the Historical Critique of
Usury, 8 ACCT., BUS., & FIN. HIST. 175, 175 (1998).
238. Mark Koyama, Evading the ‘Taint of Usury’: The Usury Prohibition as a Barrier to
Entry, 47 EXPLORATIONS IN ECON. HIST. 420, 421 (2010) (quoting Luke 6:35 (Revised Standard
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references to usury in the New Testament included Luke’s teaching to
“lend freely hoping for nothing in return.”239 The Hebrew prophet
Ezekiel similarly condemned usury as an “abominable” sin that would
receive divine punishment.240 By the fifth century, the Catholic Church
prohibited the taking of interest, and by the twelfth century, it decreed
that usurers could receive neither the sacraments nor a Christian
burial.241 In 1311, Pope Clement V declared usury a heresy and
abolished all secular legislation permitting usury. 242 Although the
Church eventually retreated from this position and interpreted usury as
the taking of “excessive” interest, religious leaders, theologians,
moralists, and philosophers continued to denounce the evil of usury. St.
Thomas Aquinas, for instance, condemned usury as morally wrong and
unjust, an attempt to obtain “double payment” that violated the essence
of money as a measure of value and medium of exchange.243 Dante
relegated usurers to the lowest rung in the seventh circle of Hell, below
murderers and blasphemers.244
Similarly, the money norm of giving to charity has biblical roots.
Although the motivation for giving can range from fear of social
sanctions to the “warm glow” effect,245 among the devout, charitable
giving can be motivated by fear of divine repercussions. Tithing, or
donating a tenth of one’s income to charity, historically functioned as a
religious obligation. In Islam, sanctions for not paying the “Zakat,” or
“alms,” include the threat of not having one’s prayers answered and
facing punishment in the afterlife.246 The Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-day Saints teaches that disobeying the law of tithing not only
influences one’s blessings on Earth, but also “[n]o man may hope or

Version)).
239. Id.
240. See James M. Ackerman, Interest Rates and the Law: A History of Usury, 1981 ARIZ. ST.
L.J. 61, 61 (1981) (citing Ezekiel 18:10-13 (Revised Standard Version) (“If he . . . lends at
interest, and takes increase; shall he then live? He shall not live. He has done all these abominable
things; he shall surely die; his blood shall be upon himself.”)).
241. Conrad Henry Moehlman, The Christianization of Interest, 3 CHURCH HIST. 3, 6–7
(1934).
242. Id. at 7.
243. Thomas Aquinas, Of Cheating, Which Is Committed in Buying and Selling, in 2 THE
SUMMA THEOLOGICA OF ST. THOMAS AQUINAS 450–51 (Fathers of the English Dominican
Province trans., 1918).
244. DANTE, THE INFERNO 149–54 (J. Ciardi trans. 1954).
245. James Andreoni, Impure Altruism and Donations to Public Goods: A Theory of WarmGlow Giving, 100 ECON. J. 464, 464 (1990).
246. Al-Quran 9:34-35; see generally ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ISLAM 406–22 (P. Bearman et al.
eds., 2009) (explaining the moral and ethical obligation to pay zakat and the consequences of
noncompliance).
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expect to have an inheritance on this celestial globe who has failed to
pay his tithing.”247 In addition, it bars those who do not pay their tithes
from holding leadership roles or obtaining admission to the temples.248
Although tithing is rarely enforced among other denominations, a
majority of evangelical Christian leaders teach that tithing is important
or essential to being a “good evangelical.”249
E. Coercion
Certain money norms are enforced through physical coercion. For
much of history, the norm of paying back one’s debts was enforced by
the threat of imprisonment.250 Money norms may also emerge through
extralegal coercion. Take, for instance, ransom and extortion. Although
a norm exists against obtaining money through force or threats, in the
absence or failure of law, extortion or ransom can itself become a norm.
In Honduras, for instance, extortion of bus drivers has become a fabric
of day-to-day life.251 Weekly payments to gangs—routine to the point
of being referred to as “rent”—purchase the privilege of not being
executed that week by that particular gang.252 In Nigeria, a similar norm
has emerged around ransom payments, which have become so
commonplace that businesses routinely purchase kidnapping and
ransom (“K&R”) insurance.253
When a money-related practice—however illegal—becomes the new
“normal,” it may be characterized as a money norm. In Honduras,

247. The Law of Tithing, 119 DOCTRINE AND COVENANTS STUDENT MANUAL 5–6 (2002),
https://www.lds.org/manual/doctrine-and-covenants-student-manual/section-110-121/section119-the-law-of-tithing?lang=eng (last visited July 16, 2017).
248. See Howard D. Swainston, Tithing, 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MORMONISM 1482 (1992)
(detailing historical tithing practices in the Mormon Church); ANDREW JACKSON, THE MORMON
FAITH OF MITT ROMNEY: WHAT LATTER-DAY SAINTS TEACH & PRACTICE 180 (2012).
249. Global Survey of Evangelical Protestant Leaders, PEW RES. CTR. (June 22, 2011),
http://www.pewforum.org/2011/06/22/global-survey-of-evangelical-protestant-leaders/.
250. See Charles Jordan Tabb, The History of the Bankruptcy Laws in the United States, 3
AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 5, 7 (1995) (discussing the practice of imprisonment for nonpayment
of debt dating back to early English law); see also PETER J. COLEMAN, DEBTORS AND
CREDITORS IN AMERICA: INSOLVENCY, IMPRISONMENT FOR DEBT, AND BANKRUPTCY, 1607–
1900 (State Hist. Soc. of Wis. eds., 2010) (1974) (reviewing the history of debt and insolvency in
America).
251. Marlon Bishop, Hello, I’m Calling From ‘La Mafia’, NPR PLANET MONEY (Dec. 18,
2014, 1:17 PM), http://www.npr.org/sections/money/2014/12/18/371658493/hello-im-callingfrom-la-mafia.
252. Id.
253. Gregory Warner, Captive Market: A Consultant, His Girlfriend and the Kidnapping
Business, NPR PLANET MONEY (Mar. 5, 2015, 4:36 PM), http://www.npr.org/sections/money/
2015/03/05/391036663/captive-market-a-consultant-his-girlfriend-and-the-kidnapping-business
(last visited Jan. 6, 2017).
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Nigeria, and other parts of the world, where extortion and ransom have
become a part of the costs of daily life or of doing business, certain
rules of behavior have emerged. Extorters, for instance, follow the rule
of adjustable pricing.254 Prices that are too high or too low put profits at
risk. If a price is too high, individuals cannot pay, but even more
importantly, too high a price impacts the willingness to pay. Too low a
price, on the other hand, impacts not only the bottom line, but also
legitimacy. A gang that consistently demands a much lower price than
its competition may simply not be taken as seriously.
The Mafia presents a fascinating parallel. Part of the enduring
success and resilience of the Mafia can be attributed to its ability to use
violence to sustain behavioral regularities and a stable social
structure.255 Extortion payments have performed several functions,
including providing physical protection, disposing of competitors, and
deterring swindlers in business transactions.256 In many communities,
“protection money” has become woven into the fabric of the social and
economic system. Violence functions as a tool of economic competition
and a “regulatory norm” of the marketplace.257
IV. LAW AND MONEY NORMS
In addition to physical coercion, money norms may be sustained and
enforced through law. Existing literature on law and norms generally
relegates money to the sphere of incentives: money functions as a tool
for directly changing the costs of behaviors. Norms, on the other hand,
are viewed as indirect, informal, and social modes of regulating
behavior outside of the legal system. Few scholars have studied norms
of money or the interrelationship of money norms and the law.258
Although theories of the expressive function of law have examined the
effects of law outside of incentives, they too have kept the two

254. Id.
255. See Gambetta, supra note 205, at 168.
256. Id. at 170–71.
257. Raimondo Catanzaro, Enforcers, Entrepreneurs, and Survivors: How the Mafia Has
Adapted to Change, 36 BRIT. J. SOC. 34, 52 (1985).
258. Notable exceptions include: Sunstein, Expressive Function, supra note 12, at 2036
(discussing social norms governing acceptable uses of money); ELSTER, CEMENT OF SOCIETY,
supra note 84, at 110–11 (giving examples of norms regulating the use of money). See also
Matthew A. Edwards, The Law and Social Norms of Pay Secrecy, 26 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB.
L. 41 (2005) (analyzing the law and norms of pay secrecy); Luis Araujo, Social Norms and
Money, 51 J. MONETARY ECON. 241 (2004) (arguing that although a social norm establishing gift
exchange can substitute for money when a population is small, money is essential as a medium of
exchange when a population grows in size).
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spheres—money and norms—distinct.259 In attempting to fill that gap,
this Part analyzes (a) money’s function in the law outside of incentives,
and (b) law’s function in defining, enforcing, and changing money
norms.
A. Money’s Function in the Law
Traditionally, money has been viewed as a tool for incentivizing
desired behavior. In the classic rational choice model, individuals
systematically gather information and choose the action that maximizes
expected utility.260 Deterrence theory posits that increasing sanctions
reduces the incidence of the sanctioned behavior. 261 Subsidies, on the
other hand, increase the expected utility of the behavior. A rich
literature further distinguishes fines, prices, and penalties. When money
functions as a price, it is viewed as payment for engaging in an
activity.262 Fines and penalties are more likely to be viewed as
punishment for doing something that is forbidden.263
Money, however, has important emotive functions apart from its
incentive effects. This Part analyzes two alternative functions of money
in the law—assurance and remediation—and demonstrates how each
has historic roots and is derived from, and intricately tied to, money
norms.
1. Assurance
Perhaps one of the earliest functions of money in the law was as
security—that is, as an assurance or demonstration of good faith. Where
there is a risk of defection, money can function as a substitute for
trust.264 The Roman arra was a “sum of money . . . given by one of the
contracting parties (usually the buyer) to the other when the bargain was
struck, as a sign of its completion and also as a pledge of its
fulfillment.”265 The Code of Napoleon similarly referred to the
259. Richard McAdams devotes a few paragraphs to financial currency in his book, The
Expressive Powers of Law. See MCADAMS, EXPRESSIVE POWERS, supra note 113, at 57–58
(“[O]ne accepts the standard currency as payment because one expects everyone else to accept
the currency in future transactions.”).
260. BICCHIERI, GRAMMAR OF SOCIETY, supra note 86, at 4.
261. See Gneezy & Rustichini, A Fine is a Price, supra note 9, at 2 (“The equilibrium level of
crime is set by the intersection of supply and demand curves, and the effects of punishment are
determined in the general equilibrium.”).
262. Cooter, Prices and Sanctions, supra note 14, at 1525.
263. See Feldman & Teichman, supra note 4, at 225.
264. For an analysis of the role of trust in social commerce, see generally Julia Y. Lee, Trust
and Social Commerce, 77 U. PITT. L. REV. 137 (2015).
265. Paul M. Hebert, The Function of Earnest Money in the Civil Law of Sales, 11 LOY. L.J.
(NEW ORLEANS) 121, 122 (1930) (quoting MACKINTOSH, THE ROMAN LAW OF SALE 68 (2d ed.
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forfeiture of arrhes if a contracting party reneged on its promise to
sell.266 The modern-day earnest money deposit embodies the same
principle. Buyers show their good faith in arms-length transactions by
handing over a deposit of money, typically in a trust or escrow account.
In the event the buyer breaches the agreement, he forfeits his deposit.
The law of suretyship arose out of the ancient norm of giving
hostages as a gesture of good faith.267 Early Germanic groups used
hostages as security for promised blood payments when rival clans
killed clan members.268 The norm continued in medieval Europe, where
hostages were used to secure contractual promises. The immediate
surrender of the hostage evolved into surrender upon default, laying the
groundwork for the law of suretyship.269
By institutionalizing the practice of giving money, property, or
hostages to secure promises, the law strengthened the norm of using
money as an assurance device. Ancient Roman law, for instance,
recognized the practice of taking hostages to secure debts and
obligations.270 In the event of default, creditors could enslave the
hostages in satisfaction of the debt.271 Later, Roman law allowed
creditors to use chattel, rather than human hostages, as security, giving
rise to the pledge.272 Throughout the Middle Ages, English common
law permitted creditors to accept pledges of personalty, or personal
property, as security for loans.273 Even so, the law continued to
recognize the use of hostages as security. As late as 1625, Hugo Grotius
recorded a law that allowed for the killing of treaty hostages in the event
of a breach or default.274
Eventually, money replaced hostages as the medium of choice.

1907)).
266. Id. at 128.
267. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 248 (1881).
268. Raoul Berger, From Hostage to Contract, 35 ILL. L. REV. 154, 157 (1940).
269. Id. at 158.
270. George Lee Flint, Jr., Secured Transactions History: The Fraudulent Myth, 29 N.M. L.
REV. 363, 365 (1999); see also H.F. JOLOWICZ, HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF
ROMAN LAW 162, 313–17 (Cambridge Univ. Press eds., 2d ed. 1952) (1972); Roger J. Goebel,
Reconstructing the Roman Law of Real Security, 36 TUL. L. REV. 29, 32 (1961).
271. Goebel, supra note 270, at 32 (explaining fiducia cum amico, the theory of bailment).
272. See JOLOWICZ, supra note 270, at 317–18 (discussing the shift in bailment procedure
under Roman law); Goebel, supra note 270, at 32–34 (“There is general agreement that at least in
the late republic and early empire there were two distinct types of pledge . . . where the creditor
had ownership, and the other had merely possession.”).
273. Flint, supra note 270, at 370.
274. Berger, supra note 268, at 158 (“Once it is discovered that payment of the blood-price
may be postponed through a promise secured by the surrender of a living pawn, the mechanism is
readily adapted to secure other promises as well.”).
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Through the pledge or security interest, lenders sought to ensure not
only that the debt would be repaid, but also that the debtor would
protect the lender’s interests, particularly in times of financial
distress.275 In early German and English civil procedure, a defendant
gave money as a way of assuring the plaintiff that the indemnity to
which the plaintiff was entitled would be paid.276 In criminal actions,
defendants accused of a crime had to either give security or go to
prison, a practice that later evolved into bail.277 Bail provides some
assurance that the party will appear for trial.
2. Remediation
In addition to assurance, money plays a remedial role, rectifying
harms and substituting for violence. Take, for instance, the emergence
of law as a substitute for private feuds between families and clans.278
Early Germanic groups addressed the human need for vengeance in two
ways: self-help and monetary payments.279 The latter involved the
kindred of the wronged victim accepting monetary payment instead of
resorting to immediate physical violence.280 “Blood payments” or
“blood money,” as they came to be known, have played a key
substitution role. In Somalia, for instance, the money norm of making
payments or dia to the tribal group or clan of the deceased member
emerged to fend off violence between the affected groups.281 Islamic
law set the standard rate for homicide at one hundred camels for the life
of a man and fifty camels for the life of a woman.282 Other lesser
offenses commanded separate compensation rates.283 Eventually, dia
payments took the form of cash, with elders negotiating the settlement
amount.284 The compensation level varied based on such factors as the
status of the affected groups, the degree of friendship or enmity between
them, the age and sex of the victim, and the circumstances surrounding

275. Douglas Baird, Security Interests Reconsidered, 80 VA. L. REV. 2249, 2263 (1994).
276. HOLMES, supra note 267, at 249.
277. Id.
278. Id. at 248.
279. Berger, supra note 268, at 157 (“The vengeful clan of the victim will not rely on a bare
promise, it will demand something in hand, the physical pledge of a chattel or a hostage as
security for the promised payment.”).
280. Id.
281. Paolo Contini, The Evolution of Blood-Money for Homicide in Somalia, 15 J. AFR. L. 77,
78 (1971).
282. Id. These rates were in accordance with Sharia law.
283. Id.
284. Id. at 79 (noting that prior to the use of cash, dia payments included livestock, household
equipment, and young women).
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the offense.285
Blood payments function not only to assuage the emotional need for
vengeance, but also to address the social pressure to avenge wrongs.
Norms of revenge regulate the types of affronts that must be avenged,
who may act upon whom, the legitimate means of taking revenge, the
obligations and liabilities of third parties, and more.286 A failure or
delay in exacting revenge results in a loss of honor, gossip, and
ostracism. In Corsica, a “man who has not avenged his father, an
assassinated relative or a deceived daughter can no longer appear in
public. Nobody speaks to him; he has to remain silent.”287 A man who
was too slow to exact revenge was considered “disgraced,” described as
“low-class,” “bad,” or cowardly, and often mocked and ridiculed.288
The norm of accepting money in lieu of physical revenge allows
individuals to calm passions, preserve their honor, and avoid social
condemnation. The law may strengthen or undermine this remedial
function. Roman law weakened the norm by requiring an heir to avenge
the death of his testator to claim the benefit of succession. 289 More
commonly, however, laws have reinforced money’s remedial function.
Early German and Anglo-Saxon law sanctioned the payment of wergeld
to the kinsman of the slayed victim to atone for a killing.290 Islamic law
recognized the acceptance of blood money in place of retaliation, with
the blood price varying based on the sex, freedom, and religion of the
victim.291 In medieval Bologna, the criminal justice system primarily
functioned to compensate victims and their families for damages. Fines
and peace agreements served to expiate crimes and substitute for violent
vendettas.292 In British Somaliland, if a person who committed
homicide was not apprehended and tried or was acquitted, full blood

285. Id.
286. Jon Elster, Norms of Revenge, 100 ETHICS 862, 867, 870 (1990) [hereinafter “Elster,
Norms of Revenge”].
287. Id. at 871 (quoting JACQUES BUSQUET, LE DROIT DE VENDETTA ET LES PACI CORSES
357–58 (A. Pedone ed., 1920)).
288. Id. at 871 (quoting MARGARET HASLUCK, THE UNWRITTEN LAW IN ALBANIA 231–32
(J.H. Hutton ed., 1954)).
289. Berger, supra note 268, at 157 n.26 (citing JOSEF KOHLER, SHAKESPEARE VOR DEM
FORUM DER JURISPRUDENZ 260 (1919) (“A dog that bit a man was to be delivered up bound to a
log.”)).
290. Id. at 168 n.111 (citing H.F. JOLOWICZ, A HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY
OF ROMAN LAW 189 (Cambridge Univ. Press ed., 3d ed., 1932)).
291. J.N.D. Anderson, Homicide in Islamic Law, 13 BULL. OF SCH. OF ORIENTAL & AFR.
STUD. 811, 812, 815 (1951).
292. Sarah Rubin Blanshei, Crime and Law Enforcement in Medieval Bologna, 16 J. SOC.
HIST. 121, 121 (1982).
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compensation was due to the victim’s immediate kin.293 If the accused
was convicted by the court, the law provided that the offender and his
immediate kin could nevertheless be sued in civil court and ordered to
pay one-third of the full blood price.294
The substitution and remedial function of money explains not only
the origin, but also the contradictory nature of certain money norms.
The law, for instance, monetizes things that our social norms require us
to treat in non-monetary terms. The law monetizes harms and lives in
contravention of money norms that eschew the incursion of money into
social spheres or that dictate that certain things, such as human lives, are
non-quantifiable. Tort law prices human life, and torts and criminal law
price bodily harm and injury.295 Part of this contradiction may be
explained by money’s emotive role in healing and rectifying harms, as
well as its functional role in substituting for violence and retribution. In
this sense, the law does not conflict with money norms, but merely
institutionalizes and legitimates the remedial function of money.
B. Influence of Law on Money Norms
Although considered alternative means of social control, law and
norms enjoy a symbiotic, interdependent relationship. To accurately
understand and predict human behavior with regard to money, an
understanding of both is necessary. Although money norms guide
behavior independent of the law in certain situations—i.e., the rules of
etiquette—more often than not, they influence behavior collectively. 296
This section analyzes how the law influences money norms by defining,
enforcing, and changing money norms.
1. Information
First, the law performs an informational function, defining money
norms by prescribing and proscribing conduct. The law demarcates not
only the universe of things that may be bought or sold, but also specifies
the price to be paid for them.297 Take, for instance, source and use
restrictions on money. The law forbids the use of money to purchase
293. Contini, supra note 281, at 80.
294. Id.
295. For a discussion of the commodification of life more generally, see VIVIANA A. ZELIZER,
MORALS AND MARKETS: THE DEVELOPMENT OF LIFE INSURANCE IN THE UNITED STATES (1979)
[hereinafter “ZELIZER, MORALS AND MARKETS”] (examining why life insurance, as opposed to
other types of insurance, such as marine and fire insurance, took longer to take hold in the United
States).
296. See McAdams, Origin of Norms, supra note 91, at 347.
297. Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1111 (1972).
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wives, babies, or sexual services, but allows for the payment of fees for
adoption or surrogacy and damages for loss of consortium.298 It allows
for the buying and selling of artifacts, but not those sourced from Native
American graves.299 It prohibits the buying or selling of ivory or the
pelt or skin of any endangered or threatened species, but allows for the
sale of dogs, cats, horses, and pet birds.300
Laws also define money norms expressively and can signal
appropriate behavior with regard to money. Particularly where the
content of a norm is uncertain, laws can signal society’s views on the
desirability or acceptability of certain behaviors.301 Semantics matter.
The term “penalty” signifies wrongdoing more unambiguously than
fines.302 Fines may express condemnation, but they carry less of a
stigma than imprisonment and are more likely to be viewed as the price
of engaging in an activity.303 The law could signal that a fine is simply
the price for engaging in the activity by setting a monetary fine that is
exceedingly low or by eliminating the imprisonment option
altogether.304 In tort law, punitive damages express condemnation more
unambiguously than compensatory damages.305 Reparations tend to be
morally tinged and signify acknowledgment of some past wrong or
injustice.306 Examples include reparations programs for JapaneseAmericans interned during World War II and for victims of the Nazi
Holocaust.307
Consider the money norm of not selling human organs. Current law
defines and codifies the norm, providing that “[i]t shall be unlawful for
any person to knowingly acquire, receive, or otherwise transfer any
human organ for valuable consideration for use in human

298. See, e.g., Sunstein, Expressive Function, supra note 12.
299. Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act, 25 U.S.C. § 3001 (2010).
300. See Endangered Species Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-205 § 9, 87 Stat. 884, 893–895
(1973) (prior to 1976 amendment).
301. Richard H. McAdams, An Attitudinal Theory of Expressive Law, 79 OR. L. REV. 339, 340
(2000) [hereinafter “McAdams, Attitudinal Theory”]; see also Alex Geisinger, A Belief Change
Theory of Expressive Law, 88 IOWA L. REV. 35, 70 (2002).
302. Iris Bohnet & Robert Cooter, Expressive Law: Framing or Equilibrium Selection?
(unpublished) (Boalt Working Papers in Public Law, 2003).
303. Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 591, 621
(1996) [hereinafter “Kahan, Alternative Sanctions”].
304. Id. at 594 (arguing that imprisonment expresses condemnation in a way that other forms
of punishment do not).
305. Id. at 624 n.134.
306. Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Reparations for Slavery and Other Historical
Injustices, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 689, 691 (2003).
307. Id. at 689.
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transplantation.”308 The penalty—a fine of not more than $50,000 or
imprisonment of not more than five years309—performs several
functions. The first is deterrence, essentially a forward-looking function
by which the law raises the costs of selling organs (or lowers the payoff
of selling them). Next, the fine, combined with imprisonment, plays a
retributive role. The penalty functions not only to punish violations
retroactively, but also to signify condemnation. Finally, heightened
reprehension may be signaled by enhanced penalties for aggravating
factors, such as non-consensually removing organs from vulnerable
persons, including the homeless, migrant workers, or undocumented
immigrants.310
2. Enforcement
The law also plays a role in enforcing money norms. Many money
norms are enacted into laws and enforced by government agents.
Regardless of the strength of a norm, however, there are invariably
individuals willing to flout it, whether for monetary gain or out of
disdain or disregard for social sanctions. For instance, despite the strong
moral norm against selling drugs, armaments, organs, or people, black
markets in these goods have flourished.311 A backdrop of legal rules
and penalties targeted toward deterring and punishing violators is a
necessary complement to any normative framework.
Laws are also instrumental where informal enforcement mechanisms
are lacking or inadequate. Consider the money norm of not charging
usurious interest rates.312 When lending occurs among strangers or in
geographically dispersed, loosely knit groups, in which monitoring is
difficult, the temptation to defect may be high. Usury laws provide a
background enforcement structure, prohibiting a lender from recovering
a debt above the maximum legal interest rate and sometimes voiding the
loan altogether.313 Debtors, as well as the state, may sue creditors who
308. Prohibition of Organ Purchase, 42 U.S.C. § 274e(a) (2010).
309. Id.
310. See, e.g., Susan Scutti, Organ Trafficking: An International Crime Infrequently
Punished, MED. DAILY (July 9, 2013), http://www.medicaldaily.com/organ-traffickinginternational-crime-infrequently-punished-247493.
311. DONALD E. DEKIEFFER, UNDERGROUND ECONOMIES AND ILLEGAL IMPORTS 1 (Oxford
Univ. Press ed. 2010).
312. See, e.g., Mark Koyama, Evading the ‘Taint of Usury’: The Usury Prohibition as a
Barrier to Entry, 47 EXPLORATIONS IN ECON. HIST. 420, 421 (2010) (discussing how the
prohibition on lending money at interest developed through strategic behavior by religious,
commercial, and political elites).
313. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 19.52.030 (1989) (providing an example of a state usury
law); see generally Christopher L. Peterson, Usury Law, Payday Loans, and Statutory Sleight of
Hand: Salience Distortion in American Credit Pricing Limits, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1110 (2007–08)

2017]

Money Norms

99

have violated the law for damages or injunctive relief. 314 By providing
both public and private remedies, the law strengthens the norm by
discouraging defection, as well as by signaling that others are obeying
the norm.
3. Change
Finally, laws may change money norms through incentives, by fiat,
or by changing expectations. The law incentivizes desirable norms and
discourages undesirable ones, both directly and expressively. It rewards
certain money norms, such as home-buying, charitable donations, and
saving for retirement, but imposes sin taxes on tobacco, alcohol, and
gambling.315 It taxes earned wages—that is, money earned through
labor—differently from capital gains or inherited money. Programs such
as the Earned Income Tax Credit specifically reward the working poor
over those who do not work, strengthening the perceived moral
superiority of earned income over unearned income.316
Laws can change both the social meaning of an action and
internalized preferences for undertaking those actions.317 For some,
legal sanctions alone can be enough to internalize a norm and signal that
the prohibited behavior is morally problematic.318 However,
internalization is unlikely if the sanction is perceived to be unfair. A

(analyzing U.S. states’ usury laws in two time periods: 1965 and the present).
314. See, e.g., Loan Interest & Protection Law, Pub. L. 13, No. 6, §§ 502, 506 (1974)
(providing a cause of action under Pennsylvania state law for interest rates imposed beyond the
maximum set by statute).
315. See Bruce G. Carruthers, The Semantics of Sin Tax: Politics, Morality, and Fiscal
Imposition, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 2565, 2565 (2016) (discussing how sin taxes not only raise
market prices, but also function as a means of cultural expression); see generally RICHARD H.
THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND
HAPPINESS (Penguin Books rev. ed., 2008) (discussing individuals’ decisionmaking biases and
advocating carefully designed choice architecture as a means of improving consumer
decisionmaking).
316. Nina Bandelj et al., supra note 40, at 41; see also Marjorie E. Kornhauser, The Morality
of Money: American Attitudes Toward Wealth and the Income Tax, 70 IND. L.J. 119, 119–20
(1994).
317. See Robert Cooter, Do Good Laws Make Good Citizens? An Economic Analysis of
Internalized Norms, 86 VA. L. REV. 1577, 1590 (2000) [hereinafter “Cooter, Good Citizens”];
Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943, 1019 (1996)
[hereinafter “Lessig, Regulation of Social Meaning”]; Lessig, Social Meaning, supra note 12, at
2186–87.
318. See Raymond Paternoster et al., Perceived Risk and Social Control: Do Sanctions Really
Deter?, 17 L. & SOC’Y REV. 457, 460–61 (1983); Matthew Silberman, Toward a Theory of
Criminal Deterrence, 41 AM. SOC. REV. 442, 453 (1976); Franklin Zimring & Gordon Hawkins,
The Legal Threat as an Instrument of Social Change, 27 J. SOC. ISSUES 33, 35 (1971); see also
Yuval Feldman & Janice Nadler, The Law and Norms of File Sharing, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
577, 595–96 (2006).
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sufficiently high monetary penalty could strengthen a norm, but a low
monetary fine combined with a grossly disproportionate prison term
could undermine a norm. For instance, to set a penalty at “a fine of not
more than $100 or imprisonment of not more than twenty years” could
delegitimize the law and weaken the norm. Although sentencing
ultimately would be within the discretion of the judge, this could
perpetuate the perception that the law is fundamentally unfair because
all but the very poor would have the capacity to pay the fine.319
A change in substantive law can also alter money norms. One
example is the money norms that have emerged around wildlife and
endangered species. Prior to the Endangered Species Act of 1973
(“ESA”), zoos purchased animals from poachers and dealers who
captured them in the wild.320 Growing awareness of environmental
issues following the publication of Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring in
1962 and the burgeoning wild animal trade in furs and pelts culminated
in passage of the ESA.321 Rather than ban the buying and selling of
endangered species outright, the ESA requires a permit from the U.S.
Fish and Wildlife Service to sell or offer for sale endangered species in
interstate or foreign commerce.322 Permits may be obtained in certain
limited circumstances, including for scientific purposes or for enhancing
the propagation or survival of the species.323 By implication, however,
if endangered species are not bought or sold, a permit is not required.324
Zoos and aquariums responded to the restrictions placed on the
buying and selling of animals in different ways. Aquariums resorted to
the barter system, while zoos attempted to distance themselves even
further from the moral taint of commodifying animals by establishing a
private animal exchange.325 Instead of purchasing needed animals and
319. The delegitimizing effect would be even stronger if the law permitted the convict, rather
than the judge, to choose between the fine and the jail term.
320. See generally NIGEL ROTHFELS, SAVAGES AND BEASTS: THE BIRTH OF THE MODERN
ZOO (Johns Hopkins Univ. Press ed., 2002) (exploring the growing concerns about the
marginalization of animals in zoos).
321. Shannon Petersen, Congress and Charismatic Megafauna: A Legislative History of the
Endangered Species Act, 29 ENVTL. L. 463, 470–71 (1999).
322. See Determination of Endangered Species and Threatened Species, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1538–
1544 et seq. (2011) (prohibiting specified acts with regard to any endangered species of fish or
wildlife); Permits for Scientific Purposes, Enhancement of Propagation or Survival, or for
Incidental Taking, 50 C.F.R. § 17.22 (2001) (authorizing the issuance of permits to allow
otherwise prohibited actions to be performed for scientific purposes or propagation of the
species).
323. 50 C.F.R. § 17.22.
324. Id.
325. See generally The Zoo Economy, NPR PLANET MONEY (Sept. 5, 2014,),
http://www.npr.org/sections/money/2014/09/05/346105063/episode-566-the-zoo-economy
[hereinafter “Zoo Economy”] (discussing the legal, economic, and practical implications of zoos’
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selling surplus ones, zoos simply advertise what animals they are
looking to acquire—and those they want to unload—on a private
listserv maintained by the Association of Zoos and Aquariums.326 The
system relies primarily on reputation and norms of reciprocity. When an
animal is exchanged, no money changes hands; instead, the donor zoo
acquires good “karma”—namely, a positive relationship with the
recipient zoo, respect from other member zoos, and a sense that it
deserves an animal in return.327
Although the ESA effectuated a shift in the money norm of buying
and selling animals, the law was in many ways reactive. Environmental
concerns grew rapidly during the first few years of the 1970s as the
media took up the cause of environmentalism.328 The rise of the
environmental movement in the early 1970s and public outcry over the
potential loss of the bald eagle and other endangered species had
already turned the tide of public opinion against the commodification of
animals.329 Arguably, the ESA simply enacted a money norm that had
already begun to form, further solidifying the entrenchment of the norm.
Where expectations themselves are the problem, the law can change a
suboptimal money norm by changing expectations of how others will
act. By coordinating the beliefs of large numbers of people, the law has
the ability to move individuals from an inferior to a superior
equilibrium.330 Consider the Brazilian government’s implementation of
the Plano Real in the 1990s. To combat skyrocketing hyperinflation in
the 1990s, the Plano Real created a virtual currency, the Real, to replace
the Brazilian cruzeiro.331 Crucial to the success of the plan was
changing people’s expectations of the value of money itself. In addition
to slowing the creation of money, the plan disaggregated money’s two

inability to buy and sell animals).
326. Id.; see also Amelia Josephson, The Economics of Zoos, SMARTASSET (Mar. 4, 2016),
https://smartasset.com/taxes/the-economics-of-zoos.
327. See id.
328. BRIAN CZECH & PAUL R. KRAUSMAN, THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT: HISTORY,
CONSERVATION, BIOLOGY, AND PUBLIC POLICY 23 (Johns Hopkins Univ. Press ed., 2001).
329. See Robert D. Brown, The History of Wildlife Conservation and Research in the United
States—and Implications for the Future, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE TAIWAN WILDLIFE
ASSOCIATION 1, 9, 12 (H. Li ed., 2007) (reviewing the passage of the Endangered Species
Conservation Act following public outcry regarding the potential loss of the bald eagle); see
generally Adam Rome, ‘Give Earth a Chance’: The Environmental Movement and the Sixties, 90
J. AM. HIST. 525 (2003) (detailing the rise of the environmental movement in the 1960s).
330. See McAdams, Focal Point, supra note 109, at 1651; Robert D. Cooter, Decentralized
Law for a Complex Economy: The Structural Approach to Adjudicating the New Law Merchant,
144 U. PA. L. REV. 1643, 1666 (1996) [hereinafter “Cooter, Decentralized Law”].
331. Andre Averbug, The Brazilian Economy in 1994–1999: From the Real Plan to Inflation
Targets, 25 THE WORLD ECON. 925, 928 (2002) [hereinafter “Averbug, Brazilian Economy”].
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functions as a unit of payment and a unit of account.332 The unit of
account, which measures purchasing power, was represented by the unit
of real value (“URV”). However, the day-to-day purchase of goods and
services—the unit of payment—continued to be conducted in cruzeiros.
Each day, the central bank declared the number of cruzeiros that would
equal one URV, and all wages, taxes, and prices began to be listed in
URVs rather than in cruzeiros.333 Although the number of cruzeiros
fluctuated, the URV remained stable. Once the public began to expect
that the URV, which was indexed to the dollar, would remain stable, the
government introduced a new currency, the Real, to replace the
cruzeiro. The Real, which was equal to one URV, then assumed both
functions as a unit of payment and a unit of account.334
The results were remarkable. In addition to reversing decades of
hyperinflation, the Plano Real succeeded in restoring the public’s
confidence in the value and stability of money. 335 In effect, Brazil had
been caught in a coordination dilemma. Although everyone would have
been better off if they had collectively believed that the cruzeiro had
value, they were trapped for decades in a suboptimal equilibrium. By
shifting the focal point from cruzeiros to URVs, which were indexed to
the dollar, the government was able to shift individuals’ beliefs about
the stability and value of the Real. Only the government had the
wherewithal and ability to change and coordinate expectations on such a
massive scale.
V. NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS
Given the law’s ability to define, enforce, and change money norms,
what normative principles can be drawn? The legal system generally
assumes that individuals are rational egoists who methodically assess
the costs and benefits of different actions and choose the one with the
highest expected utility.336 There are two flaws in this analysis. First,
different types of individuals exist.337 Although some people are
motivated only by their own financial payoffs, many more are

332. Id. at 928–29 (illustrating the 1994 transition in Brazilian currency from the cruziero to
the Real).
333. See How Four Drinking Buddies Saved Brazil, NPR PLANET MONEY (Dec. 2, 2015),
http://www.npr.org/templates/transcript/transcript.php?storyId=458222801
(discussing
the
implications of inflation on the citizenry).
334. Id.; see also Averbug, Brazilian Economy, supra note 331, at 929.
335. See Averbug, Brazilian Economy, supra note 331, at 925.
336. See BICCHIERI, GRAMMAR OF SOCIETY, supra note 86, at 4.
337. See Elinor Ostrom, Collective Action and the Evolution of Social Norms, 14 J. ECON.
PERSP. 137, 138 (2000).
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conditional cooperators who cooperate as long as they feel others are
reciprocating.338 Some are altruists and still others are “willing
punishers”—those willing to incur substantial personal costs to sanction
and reward perceived free-riders and cooperators, respectively.339
Second, individuals cannot and do not make every decision consciously
and deliberately.340 Decisions are often made automatically and nonsystematically through a complex interplay of preferences, beliefs,
values, emotions, situational cues, and cognitive shortcuts.341 An
understanding of the interrelationship of law and money norms would
not be complete without taking these factors into account.
Moreover, the command-and-control approach to regulating behavior
through monetary incentives is costly and imperfect.342 Incentives
work, but an undue focus on sanctions and subsidies may not be the
most efficient or effective way to promote cooperation. Under what
conditions can the law most effectively influence and alter money
norms? This Part outlines a set of normative principles by which the
legal system can encourage prosocial and efficient money norms and
discourage counterproductive ones. It focuses on enhancing two types
of intrinsic motivation: motivation to comply and motivation to enforce.
Both types of motivation may be elicited through framing of choices,
publicizing conformity, enhancing fairness, and clarifying ambiguities
in social meaning. This Part discusses these mechanisms in the context
of money norms surrounding the nanny tax, monetary secrecy, and
bribery, among others.
A. Framing
The law can impact willingness to comply with a money norm
through its ability to frame conduct and choices. For instance, framing
an act as illegal can convince some individuals that an act is immoral
and wrong.343 In addition, a growing body of research has shown how
338. Id. at 142.
339. Id.
340. See BICCHIERI, GRAMMAR OF SOCIETY, supra note 86, at 4.
341. See id. at 4–5; see also Samuel Bowles & Sandra Polania-Reyes, Economic Incentives
and Social Preferences: Substitutes or Complements?, 50 J. ECON. LITERATURE 368, 370 (2012);
Ellingsen, supra note 80, at 118; Kahan, Trust, Collective Action, supra note 81, at 337; Robert E.
Scott, The Limit of Behavioral Theories of Law and Social Norms, 86 VA. L. REV. 1603, 1623
(2000).
342. See Tom R. Tyler, Reducing Corporate Criminality: The Role of Values, 51 AM. CRIM.
L. REV. 267, 269 (2014).
343. See GEORGE H. MEAD, MIND, SELF, AND SOCIETY: FROM THE STANDPOINT OF A
SOCIAL BEHAVIORIST 319–20 (Univ. of Chi. Press ed. 1934) (2015); Raymond Paternoster et al.,
Perceived Risk and Social Control: Do Sanctions Really Deter, 17 L. & SOC’Y REV. 457, 457
(1983); Franklin Zimring & Gordon Hawkins, The Legal Threat as an Instrument of Social
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simple recasting of an issue can dramatically alter the manner in which
it is perceived.344 Experimental results have shown that money, in the
absence of other situational cues, can elicit individualism and
selfishness.345 Whether in legislation, rulemaking, or administrative or
judicial decisions, explicit reference to monetary valuations or dollarlife tradeoffs may be counterproductive. In engaging in cost-benefit
analysis or providing damages for wrongful death, agencies and courts
routinely monetize human lives.346 But monetizing incommensurable
things like health, life, or the enjoyment of nature can conflict with
deep-seated values and cause cognitive dissonance.347 Just as we form
negative judgments about the character of individuals who attempt to
put a price on their loved ones, when the government explicitly makes
those valuations or takes them too far, it could undermine individuals’
respect for the law.
That is not to say that the government can avoid these valuations
altogether. The compensatory and deterrent goals of the tort system, for
instance, would be difficult to achieve without some form of monetary
award.348 Similarly, the focus of insurance law and regulatory policy on
generating optimal levels of risk and deterrence could be frustrated by
an inability to assign monetary values to statistical lives. 349 But the
manner in which this is done can be critical to its reception. When
monetary issues are reframed so that they do not brazenly offend our
moral sensitivities, the reception can change dramatically. 350 For
instance, researchers have found that although most people opposed the
buying and selling of organs for medical transplants, their views
changed when the issue was framed as a tragic choice. When they were
Change, 27 J. SOC. ISSUES 33, 38–39 (1971); see also Bohnet & Cooter, supra note 302, at 2.
344. See Philip E. Tetlock, Thinking the Unthinkable: Sacred Values and Taboo Cognitions, 7
TRENDS IN COGNITIVE SCI. 320, 320 (2003) [hereinafter “Tetlock, Thinking the Unthinkable”];
Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice,
211 SCI. 453, 458 (1981).
345. See supra Part I.B. (exploring the psychological effects of money).
346. Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Dollars and Death, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 537, 538–39
(2005) (noting that the EPA values each human life). The value now stands at $9.1 million. See
Binyamin Appelbaum, As U.S. Agencies Put More Value on a Life, Businesses Fret, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 16, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/17/business/economy/17regulation.html
(noting differences in how governmental agencies determine the monetary value of human life).
347. See Frank Ackerman & Lisa Heinzerling, Pricing the Priceless: Cost-Benefit Analysis of
Environmental Protection, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1553, 1562–63 (2002); Tetlock, Thinking the
Unthinkable, supra note 344, at 320.
348. Posner & Sunstein, supra note 346, at 553–54.
349. Id. at 540.
350. See Tetlock, Thinking the Unthinkable, supra note 344, at 323; see also Kieran Healy
and Kimberly D. Krawiec, Repugnance Management and Transactions in the Body, 107 AM.
ECON. REV. 86, 87 (2017).
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told that (a) buying and selling organs was the only way to save lives,
and (b) financial assistance would be provided to the poor (addressing
the fairness objection), 40 percent wavered in their opposition.351 In
another experiment, support for a government program to clean up
waste sites stood at 72 percent when tradeoffs of dollars for lives were
masked by vague, generalized statements, but plummeted to 35 percent
when the decision process was spelled out in terms of $500,000 saved
per human life.352 Framing an uncomfortable dollar-life tradeoff in
nonmonetary terms may at times be a more effective way of increasing
the public’s willingness to accept and follow a policy.353
B. Conformity
The law can also change individuals’ willingness to follow and
enforce money norms by publicizing conforming behavior. Most
individuals are conditional cooperators—they conform to a norm when
they perceive that enough others are abiding by the norm and believe
that others expect them to conform.354 However, if they sense that
others are cheating or free-riding, they react with anger and indignation
and refuse to cooperate.355 Because the fear of being suckered underlies
many breakdowns in cooperation, the law plays a key role in
sanctioning defectors, coordinating expectations, providing assurance,
and publicizing conformity.
Take, for instance, the money norm of paying one’s taxes. The norm
is stronger in the United States than in countries such as Greece or
Spain, but is notably under-observed and under-enforced among certain
groups and professions. Nannies and other household help, for instance,
are routinely paid under the table. Rather than socially sanctioning
violators, observers look the other way. In some immigrant
communities, a money norm of not paying nanny taxes exists, and
social sanctions run strongly in the other direction: efforts to withhold
payroll and income taxes are often met with scorn and hostility. What
accounts for this gap in enforcement? A sense that nanny and other
household-employer taxes are unduly burdensome and unfair to families

351. See Tetlock, Thinking the Unthinkable, supra note 344, at 322–23.
352. Philip E. Tetlock, Coping with Trade-offs: Psychological Constraints and Political
Implications, in POLITICAL REASONING AND CHOICE 239 (S. Lupia et al. eds., 2000) [hereinafter
“Tetlock, Coping with Trade-offs”].
353. See Tetlock, Thinking the Unthinkable, supra note 344, at 322–23.
354. See BICCHIERI, GRAMMAR OF SOCIETY, supra note 86, at 191; Ernst Fehr & Simon
Gächter, Reciprocity and Economics: The Economic Implications of Homo Reciprocans, 42
EUROPEAN ECON. REV. 845, 847 (1998); Kahan, Trust, Collective Action, supra note 341, at 334.
355. Kahan, Trust, Collective Action, supra note 341, at 334.
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already saddled with exorbitant childcare expenses may be part of the
answer. In immigrant communities, the countervailing norm may be
explained by a sense of economic necessity—feeling as though one is
barely getting by even without paying taxes—and deep-seated suspicion
of the state.
However, studies of tax evasion suggest that the urge to conform and
reciprocate may play a more significant role. When taxpayers believe
that most other people are paying their taxes, they are much more likely
to pay.356 However, when they believe that others are cheating, they
conclude that cheating is acceptable and not morally suspect.357 The
results are consistent with other studies showing compelling evidence of
individuals’ compulsion to conform their actions to those of others.358
Particularly where conditions are uncertain, people decide how to
behave by reference to how others around them behave.359
The problem, then, appears to be that individuals perceive (correctly)
that most other people do not pay nanny or other household-employer
taxes. Moreover, evasion of the nanny tax carries less of a stigma than
other transgressions, such as underreporting of income or
embezzlement.360 How can the law alter this suboptimal money norm?
Harsher penalties and stronger enforcement are one answer. Imagine if

356. See, e.g., Stephen Coleman, The Minnesota Income Tax Compliance Experiment: State
Tax Results 18–19 (Minn. Dept. of Revenue (Apr., MPRA Paper No. 4827, 1996)),
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/4827/1/MPRA_paper_4827.pdf
[hereinafter
“Coleman,
Minnesota Income Tax”] (finding that a message refuting the idea that many people cheat on their
taxes had a positive effect on reported income and taxes paid); Michael Wenzel, Misperceptions
of Social Norms About Tax Compliance (2): A Field-Experiment 14 (Austl. Nat’l Univ., Austl.
Taxation Office, Ctr. for Tax Sys. Integrity, Working Paper No. 8, 2001) (showing the effect of
misconceptions about the prevalence of tax fraud on taxpayers’ behavior).
357. See BRUNO S. FREY, NOT JUST FOR THE MONEY: AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF PERSONAL
MOTIVATION 49, 52 (1997) (contrasting the relatively “trusting” tax systems in the United States
and Switzerland with systems in France and Germany where tax morale is low and tax evasion is
high); Kahan, Trust, Collective Action, supra note 341, at 341 (citing FRANK A. COWELL,
CHEATING THE GOVERNMENT: THE ECONOMICS OF EVASION 102–03, 110 (1990)).
358. See Robert B. Cialdini & Melanie R. Trost, Social Influence: Social Norms, Conformity,
and Compliance, in THE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 151, 162 (Beth Kaufman ed.,
1998) [hereinafter “Cialdini & Trost, Social Influence”].
359. Id.; see also Leandra Lederman, The Interplay Between Norms and Enforcement in Tax
Compliance, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 1453, 1475 (2003). In addition, as the cultural cognition project has
shown, people tend to form beliefs about facts based on beliefs of their own social and cultural
groups. See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan et al., Motivated Numeracy and Enlightened Self-Government, 1
BEHAV. PUB. POL’Y 54, 54 (2017) [hereinafter “Kahan et al., Motivated Numeracy”]; Dan M.
Kahan et al., Whose Eyes Are You Going to Believe? Scott v. Harris and the Perils of Cognitive
Illiberalism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 837, 852–53 (2009) [hereinafter “Kahan et al., Perils of
Cognitive Illiberalism”].
360. Eric A. Posner, Law and Social Norms: The Case of Tax Compliance, 86 VA. L. REV.
1781, 1794 (2000) [hereinafter “Posner, Law and Social Norms”].

2017]

Money Norms

107

the penalty for nonpayment of household-employer taxes was life
imprisonment with no possibility of parole. Setting legitimacy and
fairness concerns aside, at a certain point, incentives will kick in to
achieve the desired outcome. But a more prudent and far less costly
option is to make individuals want to comply. Yet, moral exhortations
to contribute one’s fair share to support education, law enforcement,
public infrastructure, and other public services have proven to be of
limited effectiveness.361 The challenge is to find a way to reach a
critical mass of compliant taxpayers. 362 The desire for conformity can
take care of the rest. Whether this can be achieved through a generous
subsidy for compliant taxpayers that can be gradually phased out over
the course of several years or through some other initiative, the focus
should then be on publicizing compliance with the goal of eventually
shifting the norm.
C. Fairness
In addition, any attempt to create a new money norm or alter a
suboptimal one has a greater likelihood of success if it appeals to the
values of fairness and legitimacy. Experimental studies have shown that
individuals deeply value fairness and undertake personally costly
actions in pursuit of it.363 Particularly given money’s propensity to
arouse strong emotions—anger, indignation, resentment, fear, envy,
shame, or disgust, among others—the perception of fairness is crucial to
generating voluntary compliance. Fairness can mean different things—
fair division of resources, fair response to the behavior of others,
fairness of process, or fairness of opportunity or outcome.364 This Part
focuses on fairness of opportunity or outcome. Not all money norms are
desirable, and for those that are not, any attempt by the law to alter the
norm should take a values-based approach.365
Consider two norms that can perpetuate inequalities—pay secrecy

361. See, e.g., Coleman, Minnesota Income Tax, supra note 356, at 5, 18.
362. Cf. Sushil Bikhchandani et al., A Theory of Fads, Fashion, Custom, and Cultural Change
as Informational Cascades, 100 J. POL. ECON. 992, 1016 (1992) (arguing localized conformity
can be explained by informational cascades); Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles,
96 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 912 (1996) [hereinafter “Sunstein, Social Norms”] (discussing norm
cascades and tipping points).
363. See TOM TYLER, WHY PEOPLE COOPERATE 1720 (2011) (citing Henrich et al.,
Introduction, in FOUNDATIONS OF HUMAN SOCIALITY: ECONOMIC EXPERIMENTS AND
ETHNOGRAPHIC EVIDENCE FROM FIFTEEN SMALL-SCALE SOCIETIES (Henrich et al. eds., 2004)).
364. See Jon Elster, Fairness and Norms, 73 SOC. RES. 365, 365–66 (2006) [hereinafter
“Elster, Fairness and Norms”].
365. See Posner, Regulation of Groups, supra note 211, at 174–75; Sunstein, Social Norms,
supra note 362, at 924–25.
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and the money taboo. In the United States, a strong social norm exists
against discussing money, salaries, and related financial matters.366
Money tops death, religion, health, sex, and politics as the most dreaded
and difficult of conversation topics.367 Fear of social sanctions—in
particular, the belief that others will punish those who deviate from the
accepted behavior—keeps deviations in check, even for those with no
preference for secrecy. Adherence to the norm signals that one is
respectable, considerate, polite, and well-brought-up. Unwitting
violators are not only shamed and scolded for being rude or gauche, but
also have their character and upbringing impugned.368 Private sector
employers reinforce the norm either through pay secrecy and
confidentiality rules or informal expectations that employees not discuss
their salaries.369
Why does this norm exist and what purposes does it serve? Some
have surmised that the money taboo exists because money is intricately
entangled with notions of self-worth and personal efficacy.370 Conflicts
over money are one of the primary causes of divorce, and money is
associated with a host of psychological problems, including anxiety,
depression, and paranoia.371 Society views poverty as a sign of
inadequacy, failure, and deficiency; those who suffer from it experience
shame and emotional angst.372 Because discussion of money “highlights
366. See Abby Ellin & Richard Trachtman, The Money Taboo: Its Effects in Everyday Life
and in the Practice of Psychotherapy, 27 CLINICAL SOC. WORK J. 275, 276 (1999) (proposing
that in order to overcome the money taboo, one must view money through a psychological lens);
Abby Ellin, PRELUDES; Want to Stop the Conversation? Just Mention Your Finances, N.Y.
TIMES, July 20, 2003, http://www.nytimes.com/2003/07/20/business/preludes-want-to-stop-theconverstation-just-mention-your-finances.html (discussing different attitudes toward the money
taboo and possible geographic or socio-economic reasons for it); Laura Shin, The Money Taboo:
Why It Exists, Who It Benefits, and How to Navigate It, FORBES (Apr. 14, 2015),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/laurashin/2015/04/14/the-money-taboo-why-it-exists-who-itbenefits-and-how-to-navigate-it/#5dd8a2dd2f62 (proposing ways to deal with the money taboo);
see generally KATHLEEN B. KINGSBURY, BREAKING MONEY SILENCE: HOW TO SHATTER
MONEY TABOOS, TALK MORE OPENLY ABOUT FINANCES, AND LIVE A RICHER LIFE (2017)
(discussing the detrimental effects of the money taboo).
367. See Chris Taylor, The Last Taboo: Why Nobody Talks About Money, REUTERS (Mar. 27,
2014,
1:41
PM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-money-conversationidUSBREA2Q1UN20140327 (assessing the difficulty and discomfort caused by discussions of
money).
368. See, e.g., Shin, supra note 366.
369. Leonard Bierman & Rafael Gely, Love, Sex and Politics? Sure. Salary? No Way:
Workplace Social Norms and the Law, 25 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 167, 168 (2004).
370. Belk & Wallendorf, supra note 26, at 46 (“Money is considered a private matter that is
threatening to discuss since it is aligned with notions of self-worth.”).
371. Trachtman, supra note 366, at 275.
372. See PETER TOWNSEND, POVERTY IN THE UNITED KINGDOM: A SURVEY OF HOUSEHOLD
RESOURCES AND STANDARDS OF LIVING 427–29 (1979); ROBERT WALKER ET AL., THE SHAME
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inequality and conflicting fortunes,”373 the money taboo may have
emerged as a defensive mechanism to avert psychological discomfort
and social conflict. The skeptic would say that the wealthy simply
engineered the norm to check the resentment and envy of the masses.
Comparisons invariably result in dissatisfaction and negative emotions,
particularly for those who are less fortunate or whose compensation
falls below their own estimations of self-worth.374
Nevertheless, the code of silence around money and salaries may do
more harm than good. Pay secrecy, for instance, can result in
individuals overestimating the pay of their coworkers and managers,
leading to resentment, distrust, and lower productivity. 375 More
troubling, however, are the inequities that can result. Women earn, on
average, about 83 percent of men’s earnings.376 Although different
factors contribute to the gender wage gap, pay secrecy can make it more
difficult for women (and other disadvantaged groups) to negotiate equal
pay.377
The existing legal framework on pay secrecy is unsettled and
inconsistent. For instance, Section 7 of the National Labor Relations
Act (“NLRA”) provides that employees may engage in “concerted
activity for the purpose of . . . mutual aid or protection.”378 Courts have
interpreted “protected concerted activity” to include the right of
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1 (2014); Robert Walker et al., Poverty in Global Perspective: Is Shame a Common
Denominator?, 42 J. SOC. POL. 215, 216–18 (2013).
373. See Saul Levmore, Puzzling Stock Options and Compensation Norms, 149 U. PA. L. REV.
1901, 1937 (2001).
374. See David Card et al., Inequality at Work: The Effect of Peer Salaries on Job Satisfaction
28–29 (NBER, Working Paper No. 16396, 2011), http://www.nber.org/papers/w16396 (noting
that “workers with salaries below the median for their pay unit and occupation report lower pay
and job satisfaction, while those earning above the median report no higher satisfaction”); Todd
Zenger, The Case Against Pay Transparency, HARV. BUS. REV. (Sept. 30, 2016),
https://hbr.org/2016/09/the-case-against-pay-transparency (discussing the negative effects of
salary and bonus disclosure on the workplace).
375. See Deborah T. Eisenberg, Money, Sex, and Sunshine: A Market-Based Approach to Pay
Discrimination, 43 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 951, 1011–12 (2011); Edward E. Lawler III, The Mythology of
Management Compensation, 9 CAL. MGMT. REV. 11, 17–19 [hereinafter “Lawler, Mythology”];
Edward E. Lawler III, Managers’ Perceptions of Their Subordinates’ Pay and of Their Superiors’
Pay, 18 PERSONNEL PSYCHOL. 413, 421–22 (1965) [hereinafter “Lawler, Managers’
Perceptions”]; Liz Wolgemuth, Why Do You Keep Your Salary Secret?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REP. (June 19, 2008), https://money.usnews.com/money/careers/articles/2008/06/19/why-do-youkeep-your-salary-secret.
376. Women’s Earnings 83 Percent of Men’s, But Vary by Occupation, BUREAU OF LABOR
STATISTICS (Jan. 15, 2016), https://www.bls.gov/opub/ted/2016/womens-earnings-83-percent-ofmens-but-vary-by-occupation.htm.
377. See Eisenberg, supra note 375, at 958.
378. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2003).
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employees to talk with one another about their salaries. 379 Recently,
however, states have legislated in the other direction, reinforcing pay
secrecy norms, at least in the employer-employee context.
Massachusetts, for instance, became the first state to bar employers
from asking about wages earned in a previous job.380 Although
motivated primarily by an effort to close the wage gap between men and
women, the law also has the effect of perpetuating the money secrecy
norm.
The money taboo also facilitates discrimination in other areas of
economic life. When information on money or prices is suppressed,
individuals cannot compare how those similarly situated are treated.381
Price opacity and information asymmetry open the door to
discrimination against minorities and economically disadvantaged
groups and impede the ability of market forces to drive out
discriminatory sellers.382 This is particularly true in markets where
prices are individually bargained for, such as car dealerships. 383 The socalled “black tax” refers, among other connotations, to the premium that
blacks must pay in order to obtain the same goods and services as
whites.384 If an informal money norm indeed exists among certain
groups or industries to charge blacks more while paying them less, any
larger efforts to shift the money taboo may benefit from publicizing its
perverse effects. Furthermore, if the need for good manners is simply a
pretext for acting on discriminatory impulses, the value of the money
secrecy norm appears far less compelling.
D. Social Meaning
Finally, the law may enhance intrinsic motivation to follow and
enforce a norm by targeting ambiguities in social meaning. Money
norms can be conceptualized on a moral spectrum. Many are injunctions
379. See Bierman & Gely, supra note 369, at 169; Jeannette Corp. v. NLRB, 532 F.2d 916,
918 (3rd Cir. 1976).
380. Stacey Cowley, Illegal in Massachusetts: Asking Your Salary in a Job Interview, N.Y.
TIMES, at A1 (Aug. 2, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/03/business/dealbook/wage-gapmassachusetts-law-salary-history.html.
381. See IAN AYRES, PERVASIVE PREJUDICE? UNCONVENTIONAL EVIDENCE OF RACE AND
GENDER DISCRIMINATION 6 (Univ. of Chi. Press ed., 2001).
382. Id. at 8.
383. Id. at 6–7.
384. See JODI D. ARMOUR, NEGROPHOBIA AND REASONABLE RACISM: THE HIDDEN COSTS
OF BEING BLACK IN AMERICA 13–14 (N.Y. Univ. Press ed., 1997) (defining the “black tax” as
the price African Americans pay in their encounters with whites, absent conscious animus); Black
Tax, HUM. DEV. PROJECT (July 7, 2016), https://medium.com/empire-south-magazine/black-taxe1a797a21b14 (explaining the “black tax” as the economic, emotional, and psychological costs
borne by African-Americans because of their race).
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to act or not act in a certain way that are deeply rooted in morality. 385
We are taught from an early age not to steal, cheat, or take unfair
advantage of others, particularly the vulnerable. We are taught that it is
wrong to try to sell something that you do not own or to try to profit
from others’ misfortunes. There are variations within each moral
prescription based on a number of factors, including the identity of the
victim or the intended purpose. Stealing from a disabled senior citizen
incurs far more wrath than stealing from a wealthy corporation. Stealing
to feed one’s starving children is considered less morally suspect than
stealing to fund one’s lavish lifestyle.
Certain money norms fall far to one extreme on the moral spectrum.
Those norms tend to be unambiguous and strongly held. They are
solidly internalized and universally condemned. Examples include
human trafficking or murder-for-hire. Most people have no hesitation
following these norms and would not think twice about reporting
violators (putting aside a possible fear of reprisal from the violators).
The norm of not selling endangered or rare animals or paying to have
them killed is also firmly entrenched, so much so that the social
sanction can at times overpower the legal remedy. Worldwide moral
outrage following the killing of Cecil the lion on July 1, 2015, is
instructive. Minneapolis dentist Walter Palmer reportedly paid $50,000
for the privilege of killing the lion.386 Although it was determined that
he had obtained all legally required permits, his actions generated a
firestorm of international hatred, disgust, and condemnation. Palmer
was forced to go into hiding amid death threats as hundreds of
protesters rallied outside of his dental office.387
The law may have greater impact influencing money norms that are
less morally stark and more ambiguous in social meaning.
Unambiguous norms are more likely to be internalized and socially
enforced. Ambiguous ones, however, tend to be weaker because
deviations are easier to rationalize and are more likely to be socially
accepted. Examples include money norms on surrogacy, organ
donations, and the nanny tax. Where the meaning of an action is
385. These are known as “injunctive norms,” as distinct from “descriptive norms,” which refer
to the perception of a behavior’s prevalence. See Cialdini, supra note 358, at 157–58 (defining
injunctive norms as norms that “motivate behavior by promising social rewards or punishments
for [not following them]”); P. Wesley Schultz et al., The Constructive, Destructive, and
Reconstructive Power of Social Norms, 18 PSYCHOL. SCI. 429, 429 (2007) (discussing social
norm marketing campaigns as a method of producing socially desirable behavior).
386. Cecil the Lion: Zimbabwe Hunter Bailed Over Killing, BBC NEWS (July 29, 2015),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-33699346.
387. Ed Payne, Cecil the Lion Backlash: Where Is Dentist Walter Palmer?, CNN (July 30,
2015, 10:00 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2015/07/30/us/walter-palmer-whereabouts/index.html.
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ambiguous, individuals tend to choose the one that optimally serves
their interests.388
The social meaning of a norm may be changed through regulation
and legal expression.389 In some cases, a suboptimal norm may be
changed by making an action more ambiguous. For instance, flat
prohibitions on dueling proved to be less effective than statutes
prohibiting duelers from holding public office.390 The latter prohibition
rendered ambiguous the refusal to duel. Rather than being automatically
branded a coward, the law created an alternative meaning—the desire to
preserve the option of holding public office.391
The law can address ambiguities in social meaning by reducing
excuses and rationalizations for noncompliance and appealing to moral
values. Consider bribery. Although a general anti-bribery norm exists,
paying bribes can be morally or socially ambiguous. In many parts of
the world, bribery is not only common, but expected.392 The most
frequent justification has been economic necessity—even those who
believe that bribery is wrong engage in it as a cost of doing business. 393
Under this view, the giving and taking of bribes does not
incontrovertibly mean that an individual is morally bankrupt or corrupt.
Rather, it could simply mean that the person or entity has reluctantly
acquiesced to economic realities.
The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 (“FCPA”) spearheaded an
international effort to shift bribery norms. Although the anti-bribery
norm was strong in the United States even before enactment of the
FCPA, bribery of foreign officials abroad remained commonplace.394 In
388. Cristina Bicchieri & Alex Chavez, Behaving as Expected: Public Information and
Fairness Norms, 21 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 1, 6 (Dec. 13, 2012) (unpublished comment)
(https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1082264&download=yes).
389. See Kenworthey Bilz & Janice Nadler, Law, Moral Attitudes and Behavioral Change, in
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 1, 250–53 (Eyal Zamir &
Doron Teichman eds., 2014) (discussing how legal regulation can change the social meaning of
behavior by, among other things, influencing moral attitudes); see also Lessig, Social Meaning,
supra note 12, at 2185; see, e.g., Lessig, Regulation Social Meaning, supra note 317, at 968–73.
390. See Lessig, Social Meaning, supra note 12, at 2186–87.
391. Id. at 2187; Lessig, Regulation Social Meaning, supra note 317, at 971–72.
392. In a global survey by corruption watchdog Transparency International, more than a
quarter of people worldwide reported paying bribes. In Libya, 62 percent of respondents paid
bribes, while in Liberia and Kenya, 75 percent and 70 percent reported paying bribes,
respectively. See Carlo Davis, Global Corruption Report 2013: World’s Biggest Countries for
Bribes, According to Transparency International, THE WORLD POST (July 10, 2013, 9:52 AM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/07/09/global-corruption-report-2013_n_3568242.html.
393. See Philip M. Nichols, The Good Bribe, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 647, 666 (2015) (noting
the prevalence of bribery in engaging in business with particular third world countries).
394. See Elizabeth K. Spahn, Implementing Global Anti-Bribery Norms: From the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act to the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention to the U.N. Convention Against
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the mid-1970s, a series of investigations by the Securities and Exchange
Commission (“SEC”) revealed that hundreds of prominent American
companies regularly paid bribes when doing business in foreign
countries.395 Within the United States, the resulting public outcry can be
explained, at least in part, by violation of the anti-bribery norm.
Congress responded with a criminal prohibition on “the payment of
bribes to influence the acts or decisions of foreign officials, foreign
political parties or candidates for foreign political office.”396 A push by
American businesses seeking a “level playing field” against foreign
bribery-based competition led to the adoption of the 1988
Amendments.397 The 1988 Amendments directed the executive branch
to seek a treaty with members of the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (“OECD”) imposing similar
requirements on foreign businesses competing with American firms.398
Several features of the FCPA contributed to the shifting of money
norms. First, the unambiguous pronouncement of moral values had a
strong expressive effect.399 Legislators condemned the “venal effect of
bribery”400 as “unethical” and “counter to the moral expectations and
values of the American public.”401 Criminalization rendered moral
denunciation even more unambiguous.402 In addition, the FCPA
attempted to diffuse the primary justification for engaging in bribery—
economic necessity. Recognizing that American businesses could not
effectively compete abroad if other countries did not cooperate, in 1998
the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention required all signatory states to
make it a crime to bribe foreign officials, effectively globalizing the
anti-bribery push.403 In addition, the FCPA provided an exception for
Corruption, 23 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 1–2 (2013) (highlighting the history and evolution
of anti-corruption norms in the United States as distinguished from those abroad).
395. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, A RESOURCE GUIDE TO
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U.S.
FOREIGN
CORRUPT
PRACTICES
ACT
2–3
(2012),
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminal-fraud/legacy/2015/01/16/guide.pdf
[hereinafter “FCPA RESOURCE GUIDE”].
396. H.R. REP. NO. 95-640, at 4–5 (1977).
397. See FCPA RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 395, at 2–3; Spahn, supra note 394, at 4–6 .
398. Spahn, supra note 394, at 5–6.
399. Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Values and Interests: International Legalization in
the Fight Against Corruption, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S141, S141 (2002).
400. Aaron G. Murphy, The Migratory Patterns of Business in the Global Village, 2 N.Y.U.
J.L. & BUS. 218, 223–24 (2005) (citing Foreign Corrupt Practices and Domestic and Foreign
Investment Disclosure, Hearing Before H. Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 95th
Cong. 1 (1977) (opening statement of Chairman Proxmire)).
401. H.R. REP. NO. 95-640, at 4 (1977).
402. See Kevin E. Davis, Why Does the United States Regulate Foreign Bribery: Moralism,
Self-Interest, or Altruism?, 67 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 497, 500–01 (2012).
403. See Spahn, supra note 394, at 11.
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“facilitating or expediting payment[s]”—that is, routine payments to
minor officials “to expedite or to secure the performance of a routine
governmental action.”404 Examples include ordinary payments to
facilitate the obtaining of permits, licenses, or other official documents;
processing of governmental papers such as visas or work orders; or
provision of police protection, utilities, mail services, etc.405 Moreover,
the FCPA provided that if a payment or gift was “lawful under the
written laws” of the receiving official’s state, it did not fall within the
definition of a bribe.406 Despite the uncertainties created by these and
other provisions, the FCPA’s implicit acknowledgment of practical
necessities contributed to its acceptance by other nations and facilitated
international adoption of the anti-bribery norm.407
The FCPA provides a case study of how law can influence
ambiguous or suboptimal norms. A broad, societal money norm such as
anti-bribery or the obligation to pay taxes can at times be undermined
by conflicting sub-norms in certain communities or groups. In addition,
the aspirational behavior embodied in a norm can often deviate from
how individuals behave in practice. The law, working in conjunction
with, and with deference to, norms, values, and emotions, can play a
crucial role in aligning these discrepancies, thereby encouraging
prosocial behavior.
CONCLUSION
This Article has presented a framework for understanding money
norms and has highlighted money’s function in the law outside of
incentives. Individuals often act in ways that are not in their best
interests, relying on instinct, heuristics, and situational cues in deciding
how to act.408 In the absence of other cues, we associate money with the
economic world of scarce resources and are thereby psychologically
primed to act selfishly and non-cooperatively (and to expect others to
behave in kind). Money norms play an important role in counteracting
this tendency and achieving cooperation, bridging the social and market
spheres. Yet, they also insulate our most cherished values—the
incommensurability of human life, love, friendship, fairness, and
community—from the taint of markets and prices. When individuals are
caught in a social dilemma—whether the prisoner’s dilemma or a
404. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd–2(b) (2015).
405. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd–2(h)(4)(A) (2015).
406. See FCPA RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 395, at 23 (citing to 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-2(c)
(2015)).
407. See Abbott & Snidal, supra note 399, at 169; Spahn, supra note 394, at 8–9.
408. BICCHIERI, GRAMMAR OF SOCIETY, supra note 86, at 209–10.
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coordination dilemma—money norms provide a solution. Social
sanctions change the underlying payoffs of an action, discouraging
defection. In addition, money norms change expectations of how others
will act, thereby encouraging cooperation.
From a functionalist perspective, the law plays an integral role in
shaping money norms. Through its sanctioning, incentive, and
expressive functions, it has the power to police the boundary between
the social and market spheres and change undesirable or inefficient
norms. Individuals often think in moral absolutes, but the universe of
things that are declared non-fungible, incommensurable, or sacred is in
constant flux and shifts with context.409 We cringe at dollar valuations
of life, but when a loved one dies, we honor their memory with
foundations and monetary donations. We react with outrage and
indignation when a member of our social community devalues life or
love, but when relationships break down or life is lost, the law routinely
steps in to price life, injury, and intimacy. Money resides in the sphere
of markets, yet it has a powerful grip on emotions. It can crowd out
prosocial behavior, but it also has the capacity to diffuse passions and
right wrongs. When that power is harnessed through the instrumentality
of the state, it can shed its profane character and take on a positive,
healing, remedial role.
As a policy matter, efforts to shift money norms should show
sensitivity to the complex psychological and emotional forces at play.
Individuals do not always behave rationally when it comes to money, so
the law should not assume rationality in designing incentive structures.
Instead, a values-based approach that works to elicit intrinsic motivation
to comply with, and enforce, money norms offers more promise.
Intrinsic motivation can be elicited by framing of choices, publicizing
conformity, enhancing fairness, and clarifying ambiguities in social
meaning. The law may be particularly instrumental in changing norms
that are morally and socially ambiguous. Money norms are a powerful
constraint on behavior. As such, an understanding of the character and
function of money norms can enhance the effectiveness and predictive
power of legal rules and incentives.

409. Tetlock, Thinking the Unthinkable, supra note 344, at 322.

